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Executive summary 
 
This project has examined, and sought to measure, a number of the impacts of 
population mobility and transience on London boroughs.  It has done this by 
examining (i) the scale of recent migration and other mobility affecting the capital; 
(ii) existing sources of research into the costs and consequences of population 
mobility; (iii) boroughs’ own experiences of mobility and the impacts this generates; 
(iv) estimates of some of the costs of mobility for boroughs; (v) a description of some 
of the service consequences of population movement, eg, for housing; (vi) the 
implications of mobility for local government finance and (vii) evidence about the 
relationship between transience and social cohesion. 
 
The key findings of the project are as follows: 
 
Extent of mobility 
 
? There has been a substantial increase in international migration to 
London within the past decade.  There is now a net increase in the 
overseas-born population of about 100,000 per year.  However, the 
turnover of people moving in and out of the city (excluding within-
London moves) is – officially – approaching 250,000 per annum.  
Unofficial (and uncounted) mobility will almost certainly add to this 
number. 
 
? London has higher levels of inter-regional mobility than most other 
regions.  This has long been true, though there has been some 
increase in outward  mobility to surrounding regions in recent years. 
 
? London has some boroughs where population mobility is greater than 
35% per annum, and where the private rented sector is the largest 
tenure.  This has also been true for many years.  What has changed is 
the nature of the population that is moving, In particular, many arrive 
in the capital with significant needs for public service support.  There 
is powerful evidence that a number of boroughs act as an ‘escalator’ 
for people, investing heavily in them when they first arrive (for 
example with language skills and housing) before those individuals 
move on and are then replaced by new ones who require councils to 
start afresh in building them into the city’s economic and social life. 
 
The costs to services 
 
? Apart from the European Commission-funded URBACT study, and 
work undertaken for the Association of London Government on 
schools, there is little London-specific (or indeed other) quantitative 
research about the impact of population mobility on services.  Indeed, 
there is surprisingly little official interest in the subject despite the 
rapid increase in immigration in recent years, and the stated need for 
initiatives to enhance social cohesion among new groups within the 
population. 
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? Even though there is a commonsense understanding of the costs and 
consequences deriving from high levels of mobility in a city such as 
London, it is not always easy to measure whether mobility ‘above 
trend’ means that costs become disproportionate to that level of 
mobility, or to separate out mobility impacts from other cost-drivers 
within the complex services provided in the capital.  But this 
difficulty does not mean such costs do not exist. 
 
? In particular, it is not clear whether it is the fact that mobility occurs, 
the nature of the population moving, the extent of churn both within 
the area and for individuals, or all three - that impacts on costs and 
social cohesion.  
 
? A number of boroughs have commissioned research about migration 
and minority ethnic residents, though few have looked specifically at 
mobility impacts and costs. 
 
? Borough officers can, in some cases, give examples of additional 
costs arising from high levels of mobility.  Such costs include: 
 
? Translation and other costs associated with integration 
 
A rapid turnover of new migrants to a borough, many 
of whom then move on to other areas, creates a 
demand for language training and translation services.  
The number of ‘origin’ countries has grown 
significantly within the last decade, adding 
significantly to many boroughs’ costs.  Eastern 
European languages; Turkish; Spanish; and a number 
of African languages have become more prevalent.  
Compared with earlier waves of migration to the UK, 
which were predominantly from English-speaking 
countries, new migrants are more likely to arrive from 
non-English nations. 
 
? Housing administration and maintenance costs 
 
New migration has increased the demand for social 
housing, particularly in boroughs where larger families 
have arrived.  Temporarily-housed households will 
often move on and thus generate higher administrative 
costs.  Families will, on occasions, have members with 
special needs that will mean the need for adaptation of 
homes – possibly temporarily.  Homes that are vacated 
often need to be refurbished.  Mobility above previous 
trends thus generates higher housing costs. 
Equally, increased demand for housing, especially 
from transient and lower income households, increases 
the demand for Houses in Multiple Occupation and 
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increases associated regulatory and social service 
costs. 
 
? Electoral registration turnover costs 
 
The research suggested measurable additional costs as 
people move into, out of, and within boroughs.  Senior 
officers are unanimous that (a) population is often 
under-recorded and (b) there are a number of growing 
pressures on electoral registration of which mobility is 
significant.  Boroughs have in some cases have had (or 
are about) to take on between 1 and 5 additional staff 
each to cope. 
 
? Council tax registration costs 
 
In common with electoral registration, council tax 
registration has increased as more people move in and 
out of boroughs.  Many buildings are now multiply-
occupied in complex ways.  It is not always clear to 
people what constitutes a ‘household’ or property.  
New migrants may have no experience of this kind of 
local taxation and will need to have the rules explained 
to them. More staff have had to be taken on. 
 
? Costs of planning law contraventions 
 
Pressure on properties as a result of mobility and rising 
occupation levels has, in some boroughs, led to 
contraventions of building requirements which the 
authority must then address.  This may take planning 
officers time in terms of inspection, serving papers and 
then checking changes have been made. There needs 
to be sensitivity in dealing with such issues where 
people simply do not understand local planning rules.   
 
? Public assistance costs of migrants with no other 
means of support 
 
Local authorities are required, by law, to provide 
resources to residents who have no other means of 
support. Many such individuals and families are 
transient.  London boroughs are, in some cases, 
spending over £1.2 million a year on this kind of 
provision.    
  
? Homelessness provision and administration 
 
Some 65,000 households in London are officially 
categorised as homeless.  Mobility has increased the 
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number of homeless households within many 
boroughs, because of the scale of migration and the 
changing nature of the population.  This increase also 
puts pressure on the administration of the service.  
 
? Social services 
 
There are disproportionately high numbers of children 
in need, and looked after children, in and around 
London.  The high level of movement in London, 
within and between boroughs, for schooling and other 
statutory and non-statutory services produces costs. A 
recent study for DfES and the Government Office for 
London has accepted this as an issue. 
 
Impact on social cohesion 
 
There is general recognition that mobility and diversity can test the social cohesion of 
neighbourhoods. However there is also recognition that incomers may help to 
improve services and bring increased opportunities to the area.  A number of 
boroughs noted in particular that the increasingly diverse nature of in-migrants across 
London helped to reduce tensions as compared to some areas with concentrations of 
particular migrant groups. 
  
Concerns about cohesion can often be directly related back to issues about access to 
services and the priority sometimes given to new migrants. In this context, rapid 
turnover of new migrants can lead to a need for political management of public 
expectations and opinion. Of broader concern is the possibility that rapid turnover of 
residents, and indeed employees such as teachers, in some parts of London 
undermines the social capital and liveability of places.   
 
Some boroughs believe that a particular issue generating higher mobility and lower 
social cohesion is the increasing importance of ‘buy to let’ housing.  In part this is 
because some of this housing is used to house homeless households; in part because 
new types of housing bring in new types of more transient households.   
 
Funding issues 
 
The Revenue Support Grant (RSG) needs-equalisation formula attempts to measure 
such factors as the costs of ‘sparsity’ despite the lack of any significant research base 
to measure the costs of servicing sparsely-populated areas. There is no equivalent 
measure in the formula for population mobility or transience.  Indeed, there appears to 
be a perception within government that mobility is too difficult to measure and thus 
cannot be fed into formula grant calculations – implicitly giving these costs a zero 
weighting.   
 
The RSG has in recent years become less flexible and less capable of reflecting new 
spending needs.  Indeed, the formula used to measure spending need is frozen and 
changes in grant from year to year are subjected to ‘floors’.  Education funding has 
recently used ‘last year plus a fixed percentage’ grant allocations. If Whitehall 
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allocations of resources to councils are to reflect the costs of mobility, either the RSG 
formula will have to change and/or new specific grants will have to be paid to 
authorities experiencing high levels of population mobility. 
 
England’s local government funding system is so centralised that local authorities 
have little or no freedom to benefit from any growth in their tax base as a result of 
increased population or economic activity resulting from mobility and migration.  The 
most usual response to significant pressures – eg in terms of language teaching and 
A8 rooflessness - is for central government to provide highly targeted, and often short 
term,  grants which cannot  address structural issues effectively. 
 
In looking for a way forward, it should be recognised that many mobile and transient 
households impose few costs on their local area and make no negative impact on 
social cohesion.   On the other hand, there are a number of service areas identified in 
this report, where there are clearly disproportionate costs associated with mobility that 
should be taken into account.  Moreover, in education in particular, there are 
extremely good data about mobility in schools that would offer a basis for research 
about the costs associated with mobility.  Somewhat similar information is available 
with respect to housing,  particularly with respect to homeless and roofless 
households. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The report’s authors conclude that the issues involved in mobility are not always 
about mobility as such – there are many situations where mobile populations impose 
little or no additional costs and are readily integrated into the locality.  Indeed many 
transient households use fewer local services and make few demands on the locality. 
Equally, there are many examples of mobility and migration benefiting services. 
 
There are, however, many types of mobility that do impose additional costs normally 
associated with the needs of particular households –  these vary from the need for 
translation services, to specialist support for the homeless.  
 
Measurement of, and resource funding for, population mobility will always present 
central and local government with challenges.  New spending needs and populations 
concentrated in a small number of areas are difficult for a centralised system of 
funding to respond to quickly. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty about 
national and local population totals.   
 
London boroughs are at the cutting edge in enabling Britain to manage international 
in-migration in a politically acceptable and orderly way. They are not alone in this – 
there are authorities both close to London, and in other cities, that face similar issues. 
Local authorities will only be able to continue to address these issues effectively if 
their quality of management, local services, and resources fully reflect the profound 
challenge presented by mobility and migration.  There is, at present, a risk that as 
migration and mobility continue at high levels year after year, London may find it 
increasingly difficult to cope with the costs and consequences of such impacts. 
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1. Introduction: migration and mobility in London 
 
 
1.1     Mobility within the London population: an established phenomenon 
 
London is one of the world’s most cosmopolitan cities. Its history as an international 
trading centre has ensured that people from all over the world have moved through the 
ports, finance houses and trading enterprises that have flourished since the Romans 
settled Londinium.  As the capital grew, different kinds of mobility emerged.  There 
continued to be movement in and out from the rest of the world.  But, in addition, a 
pattern of within-UK mobility evolved: young people moved to London at the start of 
their working lives, while later in life a proportion of the population moved out to the 
suburbs and beyond.  There is also a substantial amount of mobility within the city, 
encouraged by London’s perennially active housing market, the large numbers of 
population with no settled homes, and the scale of the private rented sector. Thus, at 
least three kinds of mobility can be observed in London: to and from overseas; to and 
from the rest of the UK and within the capital itself.   
 
Table 1 below shows the trend in international in- and out-migration to the capital 
during the past decade or so.  There has been a sharp rise in the numbers of people 
moving from overseas countries to London, with an apparently settled pattern of 
around 200,000 people arriving from overseas each year and about 100,000 leaving to 
go abroad.  There is, thus, a net inflow of about 100,000 per year, albeit the ‘churn’ of 
international migrants is significantly bigger than this number suggests. 
 
Table 1:  Inflow and outflow of migrants from overseas, London, 1990 to 2004,  (thousands) 
 
                     Inflow               Outflow               Net change 
  1990   121.8  68.2    +53.6 
  1991   113.0  77.2    +35.8 
  1992     92.1  65.3    +28.8 
  1993     88.9  69.1    +19.8 
  1994   107.0  72.9    +34.1 
  1995   130.8  65.2    +65.6  
  1996   126.6  72.0    +54.6   
  1997   135.2  89.6    +45.6 
  1998   174.6  87.9    +86.7   
  1999   214.5  101.1                   +113.4 
  2000   222.9             102.5   +120.4 
  2001   199.2  94.8  +104.4  
2002 202.0  107.1    +94.9 
  2003   173.0  102.2    +70.8 
2004   217.7  92.3  +125.4 
   
(Sources: (i) International Migration Series MN No 26, Office for National Statistics, Table 2.8; (ii) 
International Migration Series MN No 31, Office for National Statistics, Table 2.8 
 
There is some evidence that the surveys that record international in-migration may 
under-record the scale of movement.  Some individuals may understate the length of 
their intended stay and thus not be recorded as in-migrants.  Many are not identified 
as leaving. The accuracy of the UK’s international migration data is currently the 
subject of an official inquiry. 
 
Not all migrants are the same of course, though most will be drawn to London for 
economic reasons.  Some are affluent individuals and families moving to work in 
financial and business services.  Others will be temporary workers, such as young 
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people coming from countries such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, who 
will work in the capital for a year or two before moving on.  However, there is 
evidence that the largest proportion of the overall figure will be poorer economic 
migrants who, in most cases, will come to stay.  
 
Mobility within the United Kingdom is shown in Table 2.  This analysis, a standard 
feature in the Office for National Statistics’ Regional Trends publication, shows the 
numbers of people moving from each region of the UK to each other region within a 
year.  The table makes it clear there is a major movement, both in and out, of people 
within London each year, with 155,000 moving into the capital during 2004 and 
260,000 leaving. Only the South East has a similar level of inter-regional population 
movement, followed by the East and the South West.  Movement in and out of the 
northern regions is generally less pronounced, though the different total population of 
each region means the proportionate differences are rather smaller than the absolute 
ones.   
 
Comparing 2004 with 1991 shows relatively few significant changes in the extent of 
inter-regional mobility within the UK, except that of out-migration from the capital to 
the rest of the country.  Some regions, notably the South East, the South West and the 
East, have seen a modest rise in in-migration as people have left London.  
 
 
Table 2:  Inter-regional mobility within the United Kingdom, 1991 and 2004 (thousands) 
 
                                                             Inflow                               Outflow 
              1991       2004                     1991     2004 
 North East   40    41    41   39  
 North West  96 105  105          104 
 Yorkshire & the Humber 85   98    85 92 
 East Midlands  90 112    81 97 
 West Midlands  83   95    88           101 
 East                  122 146  113          128 
 London                  149 155  202          260 
South East                  198 223  185          208 
South West                 121 139    99          108 
 
England   96   97  112          122 
Wales   51   60    47 49 
Scotland   56   57    47 45 
Northern Ireland  12   12      9 10 
 
(Source: Office for National Statistics, Regional Trends 39, Table 3.12, London: TSO) 
 
 
Overall, 15 per cent of London’s households had been at their current address for less 
than a year, compared to a national average of only 11 per cent. The next highest 
region was the South, at 12 per cent according to the Survey of English Housing 
(2004/05 Table S223). This amounted to 474,000 moving households in London. 
They formed 21 per cent of England’s total movers. 
 
Two major reasons for this scale of movement are: the large proportion of Londoners 
living with family and friends, and the scale of the private rented sector where the 
majority of very mobile households are located.  London accounts for one third of all 
private rented dwellings – ie private renting is twice as usual in London than in the 
country as a whole.  On the other hand, mobility in the social sector and in owner-
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occupation is lower in London than the rest of the country because of housing market 
pressures (Cho and Whitehead, 2005).  
 
London’s small geographical size means that the physical impacts of such mobility, 
coupled with the international movement suggested in Table 1, will be far more 
geographically concentrated than if they occurred in a sparsely-populated region.  
Moreover, the complex make-up of the international in-movers will mean that the 
‘churn’ in London’s population will be of a different kind to that in other regions. 
 
International in-migration to London has long been a feature of the city’s population.  
There have been immigrants in the city for two thousand years.  However, successive 
waves of international in-migration since the late 1940s have brought about a radical 
transformation in the ethnic make-up of the population.   
 
In 1951, the UK’s ethnic minority population (which would not have been referred to 
in these terms) is estimated to have been less than 50,000 (London Research Centre, 
1997).  During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a significant growth in immigration 
from the New Commonwealth.  By 1961, the number of London residents born in the 
‘New Commonwealth’ was 242,000, providing a broad approximation of the overall 
level of the ‘ethnic minority’ population.  This number grew to 583,000 by 1971 and 
945,000 by 1981.  The ‘non-white’ population in 1991 was about 1.4 million, 
increasing to about 2 million in 2001.  
 
Particularly since 2004, there has been an additional surge of migration from new 
European Union accession countries such as Poland and the Baltic States.  The scale 
of long-term net migration to the UK as a result of this political decision cannot yet be 
fully understood.  But there is evidence that the overall level of migration to the UK 
as the result of the 2004 enlargement of the EU may have been as great as 600,000 – 
though a proportion of these migrants may already have returned home.  London, in 
common with the rest of the country, has experienced a significant increase in 
migrants from these new EU members. 
 
Many of the earlier migrants have assumed British nationality and their children have 
been born British citizens.  A number of minority ethnic populations are now an 
established part of London – with relatively low mobility.  The increase in 
immigration since the mid-1990s has brought another, new, group of overseas-born 
people to the capital.  While a proportion of this new migrant population are from the 
same New Commonwealth countries that provided most of the earlier immigrants, a 
larger share of the total now come from other countries, resulting in far more diverse 
communities.    
    
1.2   Why recent changes to immigration occurred and likely consequences 
 
Little is known about the true scale and nature of international in-migration to London 
– or, indeed, to Britain more generally.  Although, as the earlier paragraphs show, 
there have been earlier waves of migration to the UK, the net inflow of around 
100,000 per annum in each year since 1998-99 is unprecedented.  Moreover, new 
migrants are not evenly spread across either the country or within the capital.   
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The fact that London’s population has experienced (and continues to experience) 
rapid international in-migration has presented national politics with a problem.  On 
the one hand, the Home Office and Treasury have commissioned research that 
suggests migrants add to the country’s attractiveness and GDP (Treasury, 2006 para 
A34; Home Office, 2001).  But there are also complex political concerns about the 
level of migration and asylum seekers that have led national politicians of all parties 
to conduct a vigorous debate about the future of migration and a number of related 
issues.   
 
The very immediacy of an unexpected surge in in-migration has led to additional 
problems.  In October 2006, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, 
stated: “We just do not know how big the population of the UK is. Because the 
comparisons and the split between different groups of workers — young and old, 
migrant and ordinarily resident — has changed in recent years, the statistics may not 
be that accurate.” (King, 2006).  If the Bank has this kind of difficulty at the UK level, 
it is inevitable that individual councils’ data will, in a number of cases, be even worse.  
Evidence from interviewees certainly suggested this.  Yet – as will be discussed 
below – in a centrally-run system of public finance, the availability of accurate and 
up-to-date demographic statistics is a pre-requisite of good government.  London 
boroughs must currently operate in an environment where these data are of (at best) 
unknown accuracy and suggest a significant under recording particularly in areas with 
high minority ethnic populations.  
 
Because of the centralised nature of political decision-making and resource control in 
Britain, it is impossible for individual local authorities to tackle one-off or 
disproportionate public service issues and costs.  Virtually all tax and spending 
decisions are taken in Whitehall and based on long standing formulae which take 
account of particular attributes – but not mobility as such.  Central government will 
also inevitably be expected to address one-off surges in the demand for services.  This 
issue is considered in more detail below. 
 
In a wider sense, the surge of migration to London, and a number of other places 
within Britain, has produced a number of little-understood and under-researched 
consequences.  It will take a number of years for official statistics and the research 
community to catch up with the changes.  Thus, for example, we know a significant 
amount about the minority ethnic population in Britain – because it has been 
established for over 50 years.  But the consequences of a sudden increase in 
international migration are, as yet, little analysed. This report seeks to throw light on 
one aspect of this increase: the way mobility may affect public service costs. 
 
1.3 London within the national context 
 
This study has been commissioned by London Councils and has taken the London 
boroughs as its research base. Of course, the impacts of migration and mobility costs 
are not only to be found in the capital.  Indeed, the most recent wave of international 
in-migration has produced evidence of a number of migrants moving to cities and 
counties outside the South East of England, though the main pressure remains in and 
around the capital (House of Commons, 2007). Local authorities in regions 
experiencing low housing demand in the 1990s saw higher mobility within the social 
housing stock, with a minority of households moving very frequently which led to 
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knock on costs to housing departments and other services (Richardson and 
Corbishley, 1999). A number of local authorities outside London experience what the 
SEU termed ‘medium in, medium out’ levels of mobility (SEU, 2006). 
 
However, evidence from the Greater London Authority’s Data Management and 
Analysis Group suggests that in each year since 1998-99 London’s population has 
moved from being British-born to overseas-born at the rate of about 100,000 per year 
(Office for National Statistics, 2006).  This trend continues.  No other region is 
changing – in terms of the place of birth of residents – at this speed.  This factor alone 
implies that London is likely to be affected by population mobility rather more than 
any other region within the UK.   
 
Tables 3 and 4 below show (Table 3) the increase in population between 1991 and 
2001 for the ‘top ten’ London boroughs in terms of rising population, and (Table 4) 
the ‘top ten’ in terms of the proportion of the 2001 population born outside the UK.  
In each case, the rank within England & Wales is shown for comparative purposes. 
 
Table 3:  Average percentage change in population, 1991-2001, top 10 London boroughs 
 
                    % change                     Rank 
  City of London   +34.0    1 
  Tower Hamlets  +17.9    3 
  Newham  +12.8  13 
  Kensington & Chelsea +10.6  32 
  Hackney  +  9.7  44 
  Camden   +  9.6  45 
  Brent   +  9.4  46 
  Kingston  +  8.2  60 
  Southwark  +  7.8  66 
  Redbridge  +  7.5  67 
               (of 376) 
 
(Source: Census, 2001, Office for National Statistics, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/rank/ewwhite.asp) 
 
 
Table 4:  Percentage of population born outside UK, 2001, top 10 London boroughs 
 
                         %                           Rank 
  Brent   46.6  1 
  Kensington & Chelsea 44.6  2 
  Westminster  44.5  3 
  Newham  38.2  4 
  Ealing   37.3  5 
  Haringey  37.1  6 
  Camden   36.8  7 
  Tower Hamlets  34.7  8 
  Hackney  34.5  9 
  Hammersmith & Fulham 33.6              10  
             (of 376) 
(Source: Census, 2001, Office for National Statistics, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/rank/ewuk.asp) 
 
London boroughs saw, in many cases, relatively large population increases between 
1991 and 2001.  These trends appear to have continued subsequently according to 
mid-year estimates.  In terms of ‘population born outside the UK’, London boroughs 
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occupy the top ten places in the country.  Subsequent international immigration will 
almost certainly have increased most of the figures shown in Table 4 by between three 
and six percentage points.  Moreover, the 2001 Census showed that a number of 
London boroughs now have a population that is more than 50 per cent ‘non-White’ 
including those born in the UK. The rate at which new migrants are arriving in the 
city means that it is already home to just under half of all the country’s minority 
ethnic population. 
 
1.4 Implications of mobility and transience: costs and savings 
 
There have been few previous efforts to assess the implications of population mobility 
on public service costs.  Indeed, the question of how best to define the ‘churn’ of 
residents within an area and the consequent additional costs to public service 
provision can itself prove awkward.  After all, every council will experience a 
turnover within its population as people move from property to property or because of 
factors such as death and cross-boundary movements.   
 
But the extent of national and international migration within London is, as the 
numbers in Table 1 suggest, of a different magnitude and type to the usual mobility 
experienced by public services.  The major factors that would appear to be relevant in 
determining additional costs include: 
 
• the overall rate of population ‘turnover’, compared with the national average; 
 
• the extent to which the in-migrant population is, in terms of demographic and 
social make-up, like or unlike the existing population – this may affect service 
costs (such as the need for language provision) or  political management costs; 
 
• the public service needs of in-migrants that result directly from their move into 
the authority; 
 
• the background  and attributes of in-migrants (such as the need to cope with 
people fleeing from persecution, war or other problems; issues associated with 
homelessness, and  the particular issues relating child migrants who enter the 
country on their own); and 
 
• the extent to which migrants have any connections with the area or impact on 
others’ sense of belonging. 
 
Moving households tend to differ from the average in ways that may generate need 
for services. Lone parent households with dependent children and multi-adult 
households have higher level of mobility, for example. (Survey of English Housing 
2004/05 S221). 17 per cent of households that moved in the last year had incomes 
under £100 a week, compared to 5 per cent overall, and 27 per cent had incomes 
under £200 a week, compared to 23% overall (Survey of English Housing 2004/05 
S236, S113).  On the other hand, many migrants may be young employed people who 
have little need to use local services and may not even register their address.   
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In terms of costs,  the following factors are likely to be particularly relevant: 
 
• Costs of registering new arrivals to addresses in the local authority for their 
obligations eg electoral roll, taxes or for services available to them as residents 
eg social housing lettings, library membership; 
• Costs of recognising and dealing with people who have moved to other 
addresses, whether inside or outside the borough who have an obligation to the 
local authority or to whom the local authority has any obligation eg chasing 
rent, tax, fines; updating records (removing ’deadwood’); tracing social 
services cases, school students; 
• Costs arising from the specific attributes of migrants, or from changing 
population characteristics brought about by mobility eg changing ethnic or 
language make-up, orientation of international arrivals, political management; 
• Costs arising from the interaction of migrants with the established population 
and the extent to which this impacts adversely on social cohesion. 
 
 
As is immediately clear, there will be difficulties in creating a precise distinction 
between the costs attributed to ‘mobility’ and all other expenditure pressures.  If there 
is a sudden and sustained rise in the number of electoral registrations above a long-
established trend, it is reasonable to attribute the higher costs of above-trend turnover 
to the costs of mobility.  But if, say, a new family moves into a borough from 
overseas, it may be clear that the costs of managing an above-trend turnover in 
housing stock is a consequence of mobility.  However, if their child has a requirement 
for the special adaptation of a council [or temporary] property, is this cost the result of 
mobility or simply the normal cost of providing social housing?   
 
Moreover, authorities do not routinely keep data about changes in costs directly 
attributable to ‘mobility’.  This study is an attempt to identify the local public services 
where there are believed to be mobility-driven costs and then to make some estimates 
of the likely additional cost per unit.  
 
It has not been possible to provide a comprehensive analysis of the overall impacts 
and costs of mobility to London boroughs.  The difficulty of generating such 
information in the absence of an existing research base means our conclusions are 
inevitably tentative.     
 
1.5 Mobility: resource allocation and the system of public finance  
 
England’s local government funding arrangements are among the most centralised 
and complex in the world (Loughlin and Martin, 2005).  London boroughs and the 
Greater London Authority receive the bulk of their financial resources from national 
sources.  If, as this paper shows, the make-up of the capital’s population is changing 
rapidly, while there has also been a growth in mobility and transience, there will 
inevitably be higher public service costs. 
 
As new migrants and a rising population generate economic benefits (according to 
Home Office research), it might be expected that tax revenues would increase, both 
for national and local government.  However, because 95 per cent of the taxation paid 
in the UK is collected by the Exchequer, there is little opportunity for councils to 
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benefit from rising tax incomes.  Moreover, equalisation arrangements reduce the 
gains that might otherwise flow to local government.   
 
Higher costs associated with rising and more complex populations should, in theory, 
be reflected in the complex system of spending need support built into the local 
government grant arrangements.  But for reasons that will be explained later in this 
paper, London councils are very unlikely to derive pound-for-pound increases in their 
general government support to match higher spending needs.   
 
The poor quality data, and grant system inflexibility, that are increasing features of 
the English local government funding system are therefore a key element in 
understanding why the higher costs and social cohesion issues identified in this paper 
are of direct relevance to London boroughs.   
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2.  The Framework of Analysis 
 
2.1 Identifying the movers and types of move 
 
There are a number of factors which are likely to be relevant to assessing the cost of 
moving populations to both local services and social cohesion.  In many contexts 
these are seen as being generated on the one hand by international and national 
migration and on the other by issues associated with  ethnicity.  Actuality is far more 
complex than this and needs at least to be broken down in principle in order to 
understand the nature of the costs and problems. Some of the factors affecting the 
costs of movement are as follows: 
 
? The distance moved: distinguishing between short distance moves, which may not 
involve much change in service except those related to the dwelling and longer 
distance moves where people must move between services such as health and 
social services.  Costs associated with moving home will affect all types of mover; 
but if the move crosses administrative boundaries costs will normally be higher 
the further the move. 
 
? Household type, including in particular the number of people in the household and 
their age structure as this affects the number of services involved.  If there are 
children in the household there will clearly be a wider range of services involved. 
The size of the household may also be relevant – single people may have more 
limited support mechanisms while larger households have more varied needs. 
 
? Employment status of the household: whether members of the household are 
employed and the household overall is economically sustainable, and therefore 
whether members of the household are likely to use the local employment and 
training facilities. 
 
? Cultural factors: notably language in that if household members are not first 
language English speakers there are direct costs of translation, but also broader 
based costs of ensuring people can use services and are meeting their 
responsibilities and facilitating integration.  Many of these costs will be associated 
with international migrants – but many will not. 
 
? The reasons for moving: in the main any differential outcome will be related to 
factors covered above.  Again the most important separable reason here will be 
homelessness or inappropriate housing and moves associated with vulnerability – 
notably asylum seekers. 
 
The factors above relate to individual behaviour.  There are then issues arising from 
the aggregation of these moving households to determine overall levels of mobility in 
the neighbourhood and in the authority.  Neighbourhood impacts relate to social 
cohesion and the cost of locally based services such as neighbourhood management, 
and possibly waste collection and policing.  At this stage any variation in costs are 
likely to be associated with the extent of social exclusion and deprivation. 
 
Local authority level costs are associated with the scale of activity linked to mobility 
and transience, and the cost implications of this service provision.  They are also  
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related to the tenure structure of households both because of variations in mobility 
between tenures – with the private rented sector housing by far the most mobile - and 
producing the highest costs associated with homelessness and housing in multiple 
occupation. 
 
Finally, there are potential issues related to how often people move – which is often 
seen to be the most important aspect of social cohesion – both in terms of the 
individual and the local mobility rate.  In this context, rapid mobility of households 
who remain within the authority, often moving because their housing conditions are 
unsuitable, is seen as an important indicator of increased costs not only to services 
such as housing and education but to the social cohesion of neighbourhoods (CRESR, 
2005).  
 
2.2 Identifying the costs to mobility and transience 
 
From the point of view of local authorities, the most important distinction to be made 
with respect to costs is between: 
 
? proportional costs: in which the higher the mobility rate the higher the 
cost, while the cost per move remains constant; 
 
? disproportional costs: associated first with the type of move and 
mover, and second with the overall level of movement. 
 
This would generally mean that the higher the level of mobility and/or the more 
mobility from higher cost groups, the higher the average cost per move will be.  In 
some cases of course, per unit costs may be lower because of the type of movers that 
are moving (e.g. affluent, employed).   
 
A third element of costs which could in principle be distinguished is between direct 
costs (whether proportionate and disproportionate) and spill over costs – affecting the 
behaviour and associated costs in the neighbourhood or authority. 
 
2.3 Diversion v Additionality 
  
In many cases there are no necessary additional costs to services other than those 
directly associated with movement.  At the macro level it is only the net additional 
international migrant that matters. 
 
However there is often a transfer of responsibility from one administrative unit to 
another.  This can transfer the costs of providing services between authorities and may 
generate ‘congestion’ costs in some areas and under use of services in others.  It may 
also involve the provision of subsidised services where the subsidy may or may not 
follow the household or person. This raises the issue of out-of-borough placements 
which clearly concerns authorities that accept homeless and other groups from other 
authorities.  It also raises issues of compensation for net additions to the numbers 
using particular subsidised services, and the extent to which central government 
subsidy allocation and taxation systems compensate for these costs. 
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2.4 Impacts on social cohesion 
 
Whether or  not mobility and transience impacts on social cohesion depends  upon the 
attributes of those moving into, and the response of those already living in, the 
community.   
 
To some extent these impacts depend upon accepted definitions.  The LGA/Home 
Office Guidance on Community Cohesion (LGA/Home Office, 2002) defines a 
cohesive community as one where: 
• there is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; 
• the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are 
appreciated and positively valued; 
• those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and 
• strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from 
different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within 
neighbourhoods.  
 
In terms of the remit of this project, this relates strongly to issues about access to 
services and the costs of running these services, and is therefore addressed within the 
same framework. However the costs associated with ensuring social cohesion are 
even less readily measured as they include not only those directly relating to 
provision, but also costs of political management and social costs of failure to achieve 
the goals of social cohesion.  In this context, indicators such as the numbers of racial 
incidents reported to the police; levels of anti-social behaviour; truanting; and 
educational achievement may be relevant but are not addressed in this report. 
 
2.5 Methodology 
 
The London Councils project actively involved a team of three senior researchers, a 
junior researcher and an administrative officer. 
 
The main methods used in this study were as follows: 
 
? a literature survey; 
 
? interviews with senior officers in seven London boroughs; 
 
? collection of materials from boroughs’ own research; 
 
? synthesis of the information gathered from literature and 
interviews; 
 
? additional research of known sources of research. 
 
In more detail, the methodology involved: 
 
First, a detailed study of existing literature and documents provided by London 
boroughs has been conducted and is reported in Appendix A. Together with the 
review of literature, statistical data about population mobility and population turnover 
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in London, mainly based on ONS statistics and neighbourhood statistics, has been 
analysed.    
 
In order to gather as much information as possible, the researchers, with the support 
of London Councils contacted all London borough chief executives by letter at the 
beginning of November to ask about any research that has been led by the boroughs 
on the topic.  
 
The objective of this first stage of research was to identify the services, and boroughs, 
which are the most impacted by population churn. 
 
We received material from a range of boroughs and organisations which have 
undertaken work on the population turnover theme, which helped us to understand the 
nature of the problems faced by boroughs – notably with respect to accurate data.  
 
The second stage of the research focused on case studies. Case studies aimed to 
provide in-depth analysis of the costs and other factors associated with population 
mobility.  Case studies have been fed in, not only by an analysis of documents 
provided by the boroughs and contacts with council officers, but also by interviews 
with key Borough officers. Interviews were held either face-to-face or by telephone 
(the list of interviewees is at Appendix B and the semi-structured questionnaire is 
provided at Appendix C).  The questionnaire was produced after detailed analysis of 
questionnaires used in the URBACT study on population mobility.  
 
Seven boroughs, from inner and outer London, were identified for their high rates of 
population turnover and other relevant attributes. They are Hounslow, Barking & 
Dagenham, Lewisham, Haringey, Newham, Westminster and Redbridge. 
 
The case study boroughs have different characteristics in terms of populations moving 
in and out. For example, Haringey can be characterised as a gateway to London for 
different types of groups arriving in London. The rate of non British national migrants 
and placements in temporary accommodation are high compared with other boroughs. 
Redbridge appears as an area where people move in as the result of upgrade 
movements. Case study choices include boroughs located close together so that the 
differences or similarities of population mobility impacts can be better compared.  
 
Other key stakeholders also interviewed were the Association of Directors of Social 
Services, the Institute for Community Cohesion and the National Housing Federation.  
 
The investigation has focused particularly on three types of public services: general 
administration, personal social services, and education and children services. Housing 
has also been identified as a key area.  
 
Using this material (the interviews with over 20 officials in the case study boroughs, 
the collection of boroughs’ research, and other findings) the research team was able to 
undertake analysis and estimates looking at the costs to services and social cohesion.  
The last stage of the research has therefore been to analyse interview results and to 
quantify costs of mobility, as far as the information produced by boroughs allows. 
Interview findings were also compared to the data extracted from the literature. As a 
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result, some policy recommendations and opportunities for further research will be 
outlined.  
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3. Research findings 
 
Our research findings are based both on documents provided by the case study areas 
and interviews with key informants in the seven boroughs.  
 
Barking & Dagenham, Barnet, Enfield, Haringey, Westminster and a number of other 
boroughs have  undertaken research about issues relating to population totals, 
mobility and transience.  Hackney have recently published their own study of 
mobility (Hackney, 2006) while authorities such as Slough, with very similar 
characteristics to London, have undertaken research on the question. An important 
issue that has been addressed is the concern about the accuracy of the 2001 Census 
and the extent to which what data there are do not reflect the later upswing in in-
migration. 
 
Further research by the boroughs has looked at the impact of mobility on electoral 
registration, the demand for national insurance numbers, homelessness impacts, the 
costs of temporary accommodation and other housing issues.  There is evidence that a 
number of authorities, such as Hounslow, are also in the process of commissioning 
research about mobility-related issues. 
 
The most detailed research is that undertaken with London Councils on the costs that 
mobility imposes on education. Studies (eg, Association of London Government, 
2005; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006) have shown how pupil mobility and a set of 
wider issues affect the costs and quality of schools.  This study did not seek further 
evidence about the impact of mobility and transience within education, but 
concentrated its efforts on other services which have hitherto received less attention. 
 
In the main however, authorities had little capacity to produce detailed evidence on 
the costs associated with particular types of transience; although many can provide 
some ideas on numbers of people served.  The only exceptions tended to be where 
cost data at the aggregate level had been brought together to enable the borough to bid 
for central government funding to address particular costs –notably lately  on the costs 
of rooflessness among A8 migrants.  
 
The LSE team interviewed over 20 officers in seven boroughs together with other 
stakeholders (see Appendix B). There was real evidence, among those interviewed, of 
a willingness to engage with and understand the issue.  However, in part because the 
Government has shown little interest in examining the impact of population mobility, 
evidence across boroughs was not kept consistently.   
 
3.1 The understanding of ‘mobility’ and transience 
 
Most interviewees mention the diversity of in-movers to their borough.  Issues 
concerning mobility and transience are often not seen as separate from the more 
traditional ones of ethnic minority status and asylum seekers.  When asked about the 
borough’s experience of population mobility and its consequences, many officers 
describe the diversity of the authority’s in-migrants and/or their problems.  Such 
issues may be an element in mobility, though they are not precisely the same issue. 
 
 22
Some officials observed that there are different kinds of migrant: some may generate 
costs for the borough, though others will bring few costs.  Indeed, aspiring migrants 
may drive up the quality of local services which might, in the longer term, reduce the 
costs of their provision.                                                              
 
There is a strong perception that mobility has increased in recent years.  Some 
boroughs, eg Barking & Dagenham, have commissioned studies that track the 
movement of people in and out of their borough. Others, eg Westminster, have 
undertaken significant official inquiries into population totals because of perceived 
failures in the 2001 Census.  There is widespread belief that the Census was an 
imprecise measure of some boroughs’ populations.      
 
3.2 Separating ‘mobility’ from other issues 
 
Some boroughs are concerned with fast-rising populations, while others are seeing 
much slower growth. Even where there is overall population stability, there are large 
numbers of people moving in and out – creating ‘churn’.  Much work is, it would 
appear, being undertaken (or is about to be commissioned) about the accuracy of 
official population figures (eg, in Harrow, Hounslow, Westminster                              
and Haringey).  Few boroughs believe either the Census or mid-year estimates 
represent an accurate assessment of their total population.  There is more interest in 
getting these overall numbers ‘right’ than in the costs and consequences of 
mobility/transience.  However, the difficulties of describing and measuring the costs 
of transience may inhibit consideration of the issue.   
 
3.3 Evidence about higher costs 
 
High costs are a feature of a number of boroughs’ administrative services.  One 
Director of Finance (of an ‘outer’ borough with ‘inner’ characteristics) stated: “when 
you look at the costs per claim, a lot of the difference [between his borough’s costs 
and those of other authorities] – though not all – goes away”.  The implication is that 
turnover is a major factor in generating additional costs.   Council tax collection, 
benefits administration, electoral registration and a number of other administrative 
services will be affected by such rises in transaction numbers.   
 
Housing and homelessness services are particularly affected by mobility.  As new 
migrants move into the city, some will qualify for local authority assistance. Any 
increase in migration above a long-term trend will generate an equivalent margin of 
higher costs.  The NHS and social services are also believed to suffer significantly 
greater costs than would otherwise be the case as a result of mobility and transience.   
 
One borough had done particularly detailed work on the numbers of migrants 
involved - in the context of council tax over 40,000 per annum, but only 14,000 for 
electoral registration.  However in the main it is not possible to separate the costs 
associated with migrants as such from others with similar problems. In particular it is 
not possible to clarify the marginal costs of additional migrants – although there was 
qualitative evidence that costs per case increased with the number of cases above the 
borough’s expected average, in part because of stress on the system. 
 
 23
The following tables set out the potential direct and indirect costs of mobility for 
different public service areas and of different types of mobility and mobile household. 
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Table: Potential direct and indirect costs of mobility for different public service 
areas 
 Direct costs 
 
Indirect costs:  
Higher for some groups 
(frequent movers, asylum 
seekers, ex-offenders) 
Housing 
 
Housing advice 
Refurbishment after departure 
Decorating and/or repairing 
empty homes 
Rent arrears management 
Administrative cost of 
allocation of housing to one 
household / individual  
Running hostels/ temporary 
accommodation 
Securing homes from 
vandals/squatters 
Inspecting homes, performing 
statutory electric checks, and; 
time delay until new resident 
starts paying rent 
Special housing support 
Unquantifiable additional 
workload for social workers 
Indirect costs of overcrowding 
 
 
General 
Administration 
National Insurance Number 
registrations 
Voting rolls registrations  
Information to new residents 
(recycling for example)  
Translation services 
Council tax collection 
Planning services  - Respect 
of planning rules and 
procedures – loss of the 
benefits of regeneration 
schemes 
Costs induced by lack of 
information on the population,  
for example, too many people 
registered 
Waste of resources (for example 
in terms of waste management, 
bins, plastic bags) 
Changes of population mix – 
implies changes in translation 
needs  
 
 
 
Schools Registrations (administrative) 
School material (books/ 
notebooks) 
Additional Tutorials  
Language courses 
Disruption to class learning path 
Unquantifiable additional 
workload for teachers 
Social Services Translation services 
Registrations  
Specific support to homeless 
people, asylum seekers, women 
escaping violent households 
Health 
Services  
GP registrations 
Heavy operations (lack of 
regular checks) 
Emergency services 
Mental health treatment 
Treatment of addictions 
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Table: Potential direct and indirect costs of different types of mobility and 
different types of mobile household 
Group Proportional cost 
Become higher in 
proportion with the rate 
of mobility/numbers of 
mobile households 
 
Disproportionate cost 
Quantity and nature of service 
delivery, associated with the 
type of movers 
Students Registrations 
Information  
Administrative costs 
 
Households in the private 
rented sector 
Registrations 
Information  
Administrative costs 
 
Households with multiple 
social problems 
Registrations 
Information  
Administrative costs 
 
Specific social services 
support  
Health and addiction issues 
Education and child welfare 
issues 
Policing 
Rough sleepers Information  
Administrative costs 
 
Registrations 
Policing 
Specific support  
Hostel accommodation 
Statutorily homeless 
households 
Registrations 
Information  
Administrative costs 
 
Specific support  
Temporary accommodation 
Education and child welfare 
issues 
Asylum seekers Registrations 
Information  
Administrative costs 
  
Translation costs 
Temporary accommodation 
Special support services 
Health and addiction issues  
Education and child welfare 
issues 
International migrants Registrations  
Information  
Administrative costs  
Translation costs 
Time necessary for service 
delivery 
 
 
 
3.4 The measurement of costs 
 
Most officers interviewed had no rigorous and reliable numbers for the additional 
costs generated by mobility/transience – even where they were certain there were such 
costs. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given that Whitehall departments and inspectors 
have generally shown little concern for the issue.  There is a risk that councils do not 
measure the costs of mobility because they do not feel central departments take the 
issue seriously.  However, some were able to supply their own estimates of the kinds 
of costs associated with mobility and transience. 
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Examples of costs included: 
 
Electoral registration 
 
Examples were provided by boroughs of the need for one or more additional staff post 
to process additional electoral registration because of population mobility. Annual 
cost estimated as at least c£30,000 to £35,000 to deal with c500 to c575 additional 
registrations. Applied uniformly across all London boroughs, this might imply an 
additional cost of just over £1m per annum for electoral registration 
 
Council tax registration 
 
Turnover of council tax registration may be up to 35 or 40 per cent per annum in 
some boroughs. Examples were provided of the need for up to eight additional staff 
posts being required to handle additional council tax registration.  This is likely to be 
a high figure, on the basis of evidence elsewhere. But the complexity of ensuring new 
migrants understand issues such as the need for registration, the definition of a 
‘household’ and the need to chase arrears (made worse, it was widely stated, by ‘buy-
to-let’) had led to major and increased new demands on many boroughs.  Even if there 
were only one to three additional staff in the average borough, this would imply 
London-wide additional costs of between £1 million and £3 million per year.  
  
Language/Translation services 
 
New migrants, especially those from countries where English is not widely spoken, 
often need translation services.  Interviewees stated that the influx of people from 
eastern Europe had significantly increased the demand for translation services. No 
precise estimates of cost were available, though even modest provision involving five 
part-time translators would, across the capital cost millions of pounds per year. A 
BBC report recently estimated that translation services could cost £100 million per 
year across the country – a figure that was not contradicted by the government.  Given 
the concentration of overseas born residents within London, it appears likely that up 
to £50 million may need to be spent by public services in London.  The boroughs 
would be likely to fund a significant proportion of this cost.  
 
The Audit Commission report (2007) emphasises the importance of being able to 
communicate with new migrants across services.  It also notes the costs associated 
with the provision of interpretation services and the different means of providing 
them.  They note a DWP report which suggests that professional interpretation, 
though costly, may often be necessary (ECOTEC 2004). 
 
Homelessness 
 
Homelessness budgets are probably the most hard-hit by transience.  Homelessness is 
a form of mobility or outcome of mobility in itself, and homeless acceptance 
generates further mobility as people usually get temporary and then permanent 
accommodation. People who are in priority need, but were found to be intentionally 
homeless, can get housing for 28 days, again generating more mobility.  
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Westminster was able to provide some costs associated with non-Westminster 
residents who use their homelessness services.  They state that in 2004, perhaps £2.77 
million - some 20% of the budget for statutory homeless people was employed 
addressing the problems of non-Westminster residents.  These are net costs borne by 
the General Fund.   
On rough sleeping their figures point to an immense churn among those on the street  
with perhaps a quarter of those found in each count not in the one before.  A third of 
those attending the Passage Day centre only make one visit.   A major problem of 
transience is the amazing amount of churn and therefore set up costs associated with 
each vulnerable person - it is thus not just the average number supported that matters, 
but how rapid the turnover is within the total. 
Among hostel dwellers in Westminster, nearly 20 per cent come from abroad (within 
which half have been  asylum seekers); a further   20 per cent from outside London, 
and finally 50 per cent plus from outside Westminster only 8 per cent of hostel 
dwellers are therefore locals.   Westminster does not see trend growth in these figures 
- which vary with the economic cycle and with policy - but the mix is changing with 
increasing concerns about homelessness and rough sleeping among A8 migrants. 
 
Temporary accommodation need 
 
London is accepted as having relatively large numbers of households who are 
accepted as homeless.  Overall, the rate of homelessness and concealed homelessness 
in the capital is (according to work undertaken by Crisis and the New Policy Institute) 
estimated to run at broadly double the national rate. Local authority costs will include 
the need to fund hostel places, refuges and bed & breakfast accommodation.  
According to the Crisis/NPI estimates, the costs associated with these services are: 
Hostel place: £400 per week; Refuge place: £400 per week; Bed & breakfast place:  
£150 per week.  The costs to councils of interviewing and processing are estimated as 
between £450 and £850 per place. According to the GLA, there were over 62,000 
households in temporary accommodation in the London boroughs in May 2006.  
 
Crisis also notes that the money it is calling for  in the Comprehensive Spending 
Review (£100million a year over three years) is dwarfed by the costs of rehabilitation 
associated with homelessness.  Tribal found that homeless households were five times 
as likely to need hospital treatment as the average – at £2,500 per admission and 
eleven times as likely to use other services at £6,000 per event. A homeless person is 
nearly 50 times more likely to suffer violence at a cost of £360 per occurrence.  
Overall the costs of homelessness are argued to be as high as £50,000 per annum. 
 
Of course, not all are newly homeless, or ‘above-trend’, in terms of their mobility.  
Transience has long been a feature in London.  However, given the rapid nature of 
recent population growth and mobility, a proportion of homelessness costs in London 
boroughs will be attributable to transience.  Such a number is likely, on conservative 
estimates, to be several tens of millions of pounds per year, though it is impossible to 
be precise.  
 
The issue of out-of-borough placements of households in temporary accommodation 
was also raised as a potential mobility cost for the ‘receiving’ authority.  In this 
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instance, the non-housing costs are borne by the ‘receiving’ authority rather than the 
‘originating’ one.  Boroughs using out-of-borough placements often concentrate on 
accommodating local households within their own borough.  This may mean that the 
costs of those housed elsewhere can be higher because of  lack of family and other 
support mechanisms. 
 
Street homelessness  
 
In central London authorities, is has been estimated that street homelessness includes 
30 to 40 people from Poland.  Home Office grant of £167,000 is paid to fund 
provision – circa £400 to £500 per homeless person. It is not clear whether there are 
any additional impacts on boroughs’ own costs, though this is likely.  More generally, 
street homelessness is the most direct evidence of transience and boroughs with 
significant  problems can be spending many millions in addressing the issues.  One 
borough spoke of settling over 500 rough sleepers in accommodation  in 2005/06 as 
well as providing additional services to transients over the last two years in response 
to a rapid increase in the numbers needing help mainly from outside the borough and 
often from outside the country.  
 
Housing advice 
 
Much of the total cost of the service due either to dealing with (forced, unwelcome) 
mobility or threats of loss of home, or enabling mobility (finding new homes for 
homeless or those threatened with homelessness). 
 
Permanent housing need 
 
Once new migrants move out of temporary accommodation, many will require 
permanent homes.  Given the pre-existing shortage of such property, mobility will add 
marginal higher costs on the existing major cost of London housing. This issue is 
discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report. 
 
Social housing lettings 
 
The cost of social housing lettings activities, as a means to, or a form of, mobility, 
could be all or partly  seen as a cost of mobility in itself. Many London and other 
councils have decided on a cost-benefit basis that levels of turnover amongst the 
applicant population themselves mean that an annual review of the register is 
worthwhile. Choice Based Lettings pass some of work of maintaining the register and 
administering lettings policy to applicants, but in practice have not meant any 
reduction in local authority and RSL activity, with new roles in advertising access, 
and providing support to some potential applicants. 
 
Social housing management and maintenance 
Several studies of the correlates or drivers of housing management costs point to 
mobility or tenancy turnover rates. Balkman et al. found that costs correlated with the 
proportion of flats and resident deprivation (which are likely to be correlated to 
mobility) (1992). Another study from the same period included mobility as a key 
correlate, and found that the proportion of flats, average density and the number of 
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lettings - as an indicator of turnover and mobility - together accounted for  up to 75 
per cent of the variance in costs between councils (Bines et al., 1993). According to 
ODPM, BRE found void and re-let levels to be a significant driver of costs. Their 
national ‘need to spend’ model estimates that some 14% of total maintenance costs 
for all England arise simply from works to empty homes. In addition, they found that  
voids management and allocations account for around 15% of national total 
management costs (ODPM, 2003b). After this work, ODPM decided recently to add 
an indicator of mobility to the formulae currently used to calculate management and 
maintenance costs. Management costs are to be calculated from the number of relets 
per year and voids,  as well as the built form, age and size of each authority's housing 
stock, repairs backlog , crime levels, and regional variations in building costs. 
Maintenance costs are to be calculated from the number of re-lets per year and voids 
rates, as well as the size of the authority and factors such as the proportion of flats . 
(ODPM, 2003a, 2003b).  
As in the case of other local authority revenue functions, maintaining rent accounts 
and chasing arrears are affected by mobility. Many local authorities have specialised 
‘former tenants’ arrears officers’ which are a direct cost of (high) mobility. 
 
Housing-related support 
 
Most of the costs of several other specialised services provided by local authority 
housing departments, RSLs and social service departments could be attributed to high 
mobility or attempts to reduce it. These include travellers’ services (this was a big 
issue in the selected boroughs), sustaining tenancies and floating support costs for ex-
homeless or otherwise vulnerable people (borne by Local authorities, RSLs, 
Supporting People budgets, and voluntary organisations), specialised services for 
asylum seekers and refugees, and all of the costs of  temporary accommodation  
 
Houses in multiple occupation  
 
These have, it has been reported to us, rapidly increased in number.  Slough BC has 
estimated it costs £400 per property to investigate each one.  Many London authorities 
are having to devote resources to this issue. Applied in the capital, the Slough 
numbers would suggest the need to inspect even 10 properties per borough per year 
would lead to overall costs of £120,000.   
      
Housing benefit requirement (administration) 
 
As in the previous section, ‘above trend’ mobility generates new housing benefit 
processing requirements of the kind experienced for council tax and electoral 
registration.  No numbers were quoted by interviewees, but some higher costs are 
inevitable. 
 
Asylum claim assistance 
 
Although the numbers of asylum seekers are well down on those experienced at their 
peak, London boroughs remain among the main recipients of new residents who are 
claiming asylum.  Officers will be involved in providing advice and possibly 
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resources (see below) to such individuals.  No estimates are available, though the 
costs will be real. 
 
Schools 
 
The research cited in the literature survey, undertaken for the Association of London 
Government, suggested that in a primary school, enrolment of a new child, plus work 
with the parents and child, averaged 14½ additional hours at an estimated cost of £400 
each.  For secondary schools, the same process represents an average of 29 hours of 
additional work and estimated costs of about £800. Moreover the study also reported 
that pupil mobility also required difficult-to-quantify work involving teachers and 
others such as extra learning and teaching support staff, which has been estimated to 
fall within a range of zero to 62 hours per child.   
 
Above-trend mobility and transience will add to the costs of many London schools.  
In some cases, the proportion of pupils arriving and leaving during the course of a 
year can range from a third to a half.  In other parts of the country, such numbers 
would be very much lower.   
 
English language training 
 
New migrants will, in many cases, require language training to fit them out for life in 
Britain. Interviewees in a number of boroughs observed that they believed people 
move to an authority in the first instance and then, as they become more settled, move 
on.  Some boroughs find themselves having to provide language training for an 
‘escalator’ of people moving into the country.  While no estimates of cost were given, 
even modest levels of language training for a London ‘foreign-born’ population that 
increases by 100,000 per annum would cost tens of millions of pounds. (20,000 
people trained at a cost of £1,000 per head would lead to total costs of £20 million). 
 
Council tax benefit requirement 
 
As with housing benefit turnover, the demands of a mobile population will add to 
those that would normally be experienced in any authority.  The risk that complex 
rules might be misunderstood, or of fraud, mean that new migrants will require a 
disproportionate amount of time devoted to their cases. Interviewees confirmed this 
issue, but no cost estimates were available. 
  
Social services needs 
 
The URBACT report discussed in the literature survey considered ‘transition costs’ as 
people moved from one status to another after they arrive in Britain. There is a need 
for services assisting people as they move from specialist support services to 
mainstream provision, and as groups such as asylum seekers move towards self-
reliance. Interviewees accept this is an issue, though cost estimates were not available. 
 
A DfES/GOL report (2006), undertaken by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and considered 
in the literature review (see Appendix A), concluded that many services would be 
affected by the consequences of mobility among the young.  The government’s 
consultants stated: “In London, and the local authorities surrounding London which 
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children and young people move between, the challenge to be able to adapt is 
particularly high.  This is because of the disproportionately high numbers of children 
in need and looked after children, and the high level of movement in London, within 
and between Boroughs for schooling and other statutory and non-statutory services”. 
 
Destitution costs 
 
Boroughs are, by law, responsible for support to persons from abroad with no 
recourse to public funds.  One borough provided details of its need to spend about 
£1.2 million in 2005-06 on such support.  Other authorities would generally need to 
spend rather less that this, but the overall cost across London will probably range 
from £10 to £20 million.  
 
Regeneration  
 
Efforts to regenerate boroughs must ‘run hard to stand still’ in places such as 
Southwark and Newham.  Ambitious populations move on once they have become 
successful, making achievement of government targets difficult.  Costs are higher 
because the authority is always starting again with new residents. 
 
Planning  
 
Planning departments have additional costs as new populations behave differently 
and/or make new demands on the area.  Examples of new, informal, housing 
development were reported in one borough, though others accepted that new 
communities may, on occasion, use housing in innovative ways that challenge 
existing planning rules.  Others have met costs because of need for new churches on 
non-traditional sites.   
 
The NHS  
 
Although not a borough responsibility, the NHS was widely reported by borough 
officers to suffer significant costs, as many new migrants do not register with GPs, so 
people go immediately to Accident & Emergency services.  Moreover, it is hard to 
undertake any preventive care with many mobile/new populations.  There will be 
knock-on cost implications for social services as a result of NHS costs. 
 
Overall assessment  
 
There is no way that the numbers citied above can be added together to produce a 
single, robust, total for ‘mobility costs’ within London.  We have been clear that it is 
difficult to be precise even about ‘above trend’ mobility let alone disproportionate 
costs.  Nor is it possible to draw a line between whether particular expenditure needs 
result from ‘transience’ or more normal factors.   
 
What is clear is that transients and migrants fall into two main categories – those that 
are likely to impose lower than average costs on services because they do not need to 
use these services and often do not even register to do so; and those that have needs 
over and above the average mover – in some cases far in excess because of particular 
household circumstances and earlier experiences.   
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More generally, increased population and mobility clearly put stress on existing 
services and therefore increased costs – either direct or social costs - because of 
poorer services and unequal access. In this context it is easy to see that new entrants 
(whether or not they are potentially transient ) will be seen as one of the causes of 
inadequate services  -and this then leads on to difficulties – and the need for 
expenditure on political management and initiatives to improve social inclusion. 
 
The figures suggested in the sub-headings above would imply annual costs to London 
boroughs of substantial sums that are very likely to exceed £100 million per annum 
and which might do so by a  larger amount.   
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4. Implications for Public Services 
 
The literature survey, interviews and other research conducted for this study have 
produced much evidence about the impact of population mobility and transience on 
services provided both by London boroughs and other public services.  It is evident 
that those providing such services are, in many cases, able to point to costs, pressures 
on staff, and a lack of effective provision for many residents who move to or within 
the authority. 
 
However, there are significant difficulties (as stated earlier) in making precise 
measurements of many of the impacts of mobility.  It is possible to produce evidence 
of the kind quoted in the State of the English Cities Report which showed that both 
within-UK and international migration had a significantly greater impact in London 
than in other kinds of city, town and rural area.  There appears to be a settled pattern 
of people moving in large numbers in and out of London, to the rest of the UK, and to 
and from overseas. 
 
Many London borough officers see their authority as facing a population that is 
constantly changing.  For those such as Barking & Dagenham, Newham, Haringey 
Hounslow and Lewisham (though this finding will undoubtedly apply to others such 
as Southwark, Hackney and even parts of Westminster) there is a strong sense that 
people move into the borough (generally at the very start of their time in London) and 
then move on to another authority. 
 
New migrants to an authority are likely to require some or all of a number of public 
services.  The poorer and more dependent such people are, the greater the likely cost 
to the authorities concerned.  These costs, many of which have been discussed above, 
include those listed below.  Potential service demands, which will not apply to all 
migrants, are listed in broad order they are likely to be needed.   
 
? Temporary accommodation need 
? Translation services 
? Housing benefit requirement 
? Asylum claim assistance 
? Registration at school(s) 
? English language training 
? Council tax registration 
? Council tax benefit requirement 
? Social services needs 
? Permanent housing need 
? Home adaptation need 
? Re-registration for council tax 
? Re-registration for council tax benefit 
? Planning service demands 
? Environmental service demands 
 
Thus, it is possible to imagine a stylised account of a new family arriving in a 
borough, such as Newham or Barking & Dagenham, who might go through the 
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following process of assimilation and service use. It is not likely that a single family 
would follow this precise path and in this order, but the general point is well made.   
 
International migration 
 
On first arrival, they may immediately need temporary accommodation. It may be 
necessary for the authority to have translation services ready to help with processing 
their requirements.  Once accommodation has been found, there will almost certainly 
be a need for a housing benefit claim.  Some migrants will have asylum problems that 
the council may need to provide advice about.  If there are children in the household, 
it will be important to move them as quickly as possible into a local school.  Both 
children and their parents may then require English language training.  Any household 
that does not pay rent inclusive of council tax will have to register for council tax.  
Many new householders will qualify for council tax benefit. Once settled into a home 
and school, it is likely that some will need social services support and will then seek 
permanent accommodation from a social landlord.  Processing such demands may be 
complex because of the limited availability of homes and the needs-based allocation 
system.  
 
A permanent or longer-term temporary home may need adaptation for elderly or 
disabled members of the household.  Where there is a movement from temporary to 
permanent (or new temporary) accommodation, it will be necessary to re-register for 
council tax, council tax benefit and housing benefit.  New householders may then 
decide to change their homes, thus requiring planning services.  Similarly, new 
residents may place additional demands on local environmental provision, especially 
if they are from a significantly different cultural background to that found in London.    
 
Few new migrants to London will understand who does what and how to access 
services.  ‘The Council’ will inevitably be the first reference point for virtually all 
cases.  Although it might be argued that the stylised account above might apply to any 
new household moving to London, the research conducted for this report has 
undoubtedly suggested there has been a significant growth in mobility and thus in the 
kind of demands on councils suggested above.  The overall international migration 
data shown in Table 1 of this report attest to the radical change that has occurred in 
international movement.  Many of our interviewees believed (and could in some cases 
produce evidence) that population estimates were significantly under-counting 
international migration to London. 
 
Mobility within London 
 
Costs relating to mobility can occur quite independently of international migration or 
of any form of long distance migration. Another stylised account describes an 
individual or a household that may have lived in London for many years, even for the 
entire lives of all its members, but with frequent changes of address within the city. 
 
For some households, frequent moves can be a symptom of multiple social problems, 
including poverty, mental health problems, addictions, learning difficulties, violent 
personal relationships, and difficulty coping with family and household 
responsibilities, with neighbours, or  involvement in crime (Keane and Corbishley, 
1999; DCLG, 2005). Households may choose to move home to get away from 
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problems with neighbours, from or debts, or to try to improve their situation. They 
may be forced to move through conflict with neighbours or debtors, rent arrears, or 
pressure or legal proceedings from private or social landlords, or loss of owned 
homes. Local authorities and other public agencies may have intense contact with 
these households on a reactive basis or at times of crisis. In addition to proving extra 
assistance to enable household members to register with standard services, such as 
GPs and  schools, public agencies may prepare complex - and costly - packages of 
support or intervention for household members or the entire family, for example 
combining the activities of police, social services and the health service. However, the 
disruption of moves, particularly forced moves, may themselves add to households’ 
problems, and will clearly derail any service plans. This creates extra costs to 
services, as designated resources may go unused, while staff time is spent in re-
establishing links with the household. The household may have moved to another 
administrative area or service team, even if they are within the same borough, so that 
relationships between services and between the household and services have to be re-
established. The household may break up, with different members in different areas 
yet still possibly requiring support.  
 
Some of this high mobility is likely to be ‘concealed mobility’, in parallel to and 
linked to the phenomenon of concealed homelessness. Some studies of areas with low 
demand for housing have identified small numbers of households who maintained 
extremely high rates of mobility for extended periods (eg Richardson and Corbishley, 
1999). However, the extent to which any household, particularly a multi-member 
household, and particularly one with child members, can continue to move like this 
within London’s tight housing market is limited. Chaotic and frequently moving 
individuals may end up as rough sleepers. Chaotic and frequently moving households 
with children or other recognised vulnerability are likely to end up presenting to a 
local authority and being accepted as homeless. They may then go through the usual 
homelessness route,  which in itself implies further, if state-sanctioned and supported, 
mobility. They may receive first of all very short-term temporary accommodation, 
followed by further temporary accommodation usually in the private rented or social 
sector, with a view to a secure or assured tenancy in the social rented sector in about 
two years. This may be in the local authority in which they made the claim, but 
substantial numbers will be housed further away, meaning support can only be 
provided once new services have become aware of their needs and new relationships 
are established.  
 
At any point in this process, if there is insufficient support to enable them to maintain 
their accommodation, the household may lose or leave its accommodation once more, 
and move into another cycle of homelessness.  
 
Some borough respondents identified small numbers of households involved in this 
kind of process, whose needs had a disproportionate impact on services, partly due to 
the costs of their mobility.  
 
Low cost mobility 
 
It is important to note that some mobility into and within London may work to reduce 
costs.  Some boroughs are likely to receive new migrants, or people moving from 
another London borough, who are travelling up the escalator of establishing 
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themselves within Britain.  Thus, some interviewees have pointed to highly-educated 
migrants from Africa who are moving into London schools and helping to raise 
standards.  Elsewhere, there is evidence that earlier migrants to London (especially 
those who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s) are now, as they become more 
affluent, moving to boroughs such as Redbridge and Harrow where their acquired 
skills and attributes may make them relatively easy to settle.  Of course, these 
boroughs themselves receive new migrants, so they will face some of the mobility 
costs discussed elsewhere in this report.  But the overall impact of mobility and 
transience on a number of authorities may be less costly than for others.  
 
The demands on services arising because of mobility will fall on a number of different 
council departments.  What were previously education departments, personal social 
services, planning, environmental health, housing and central services would all have 
seen increased costs because of migration and transience.  Evidence suggests that 
auditors will also have had to increase their workload to check the larger numbers of 
increasingly complex benefit and council tax cases.  New ‘children’s services’ 
departments will now bear the costs of schools and part of social services demands, 
while in many boroughs there have been other re-configurations of departmental 
structures. Nevertheless, it remains the case that a number of different departments 
will have to put in place staff and facilities to cope with an increasingly mobile 
population.  
 
There are wider implications for London borough services than the direct impacts on 
departments and officials.  In many authorities, there is a painful competition for 
scarce services and resources.  The arrival of mobile populations and new migrants 
will intensify such competition in ways documented earlier in this report.  Because the 
system of resource allocation, discussed in the following section, is inflexible and 
slow to respond, there is little doubt that at the margin there is a risk that mobility will 
create costs and pressures that, in turn, deny services to other local residents.  This is 
potentially a controversial and difficult issue that will also be considered in the 
section on social cohesion.  
 
A recent example of the potential knock-on impact of mobility costs has been 
provided by Hillingdon’s need to support unaccompanied asylum seekers.  These 
numbers are significant compared with all other local authorities (Heathrow Airport is 
in the borough) and, while asylum numbers are lower nationally than in recent years, 
they are still above the numbers that were deemed the ‘trend’ in the longer-term past.  
 
Hillingdon is supporting 900 unaccompanied asylum seekers, the highest number of 
any council in Britain. Government grant to support such individuals has been 
changed, with the result that the council estimates it will have to fund £1.6m for the 
financial year 2004/05 which was not, at the time, planned for. It will also have to 
fund £4.7m for the financial year 2005/06 and there will be an estimated on-going 
future annual impact of £6m. 
 
It is to be expected that a borough with the world’s largest international airport would 
have large numbers of migrants entering it.  Many will immediately pass along the 
Piccadilly Line into other authorities.  But a proportion, particularly of groups such as 
asylum seekers, will stay put.  The mobility of the global population shows up 
relatively visibly in Hillingdon. 
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There will be an impact both on the borough’s services for asylum seekers and also, if 
there is insufficient government grant, on other services that will face shortfalls if 
resources are diverted to cover the additional costs of high levels of ‘mobile’ 
residents.  This example is a particular one, given Heathrow’s location, but the 
principle is likely to hold more generally and for less visible kinds of cost-driver.   
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5. Social Cohesion 
 
‘Social cohesion’ is a concept that has been used increasingly in recent years to 
describe the shape and health of civil society within an area.  People use the term 
differently from time to time.  But generally the term is applied to the relationships 
between people living within an area, in terms of their social, economic and cultural 
relations.  Cohesion can be strengthened or weakened by factors such as changes in 
the economy, demography or the physical environment.   
 
Over the last few years the term has been used particularly in relation to issues around 
cultural and ethnic differences, notably in response to the riots in Northern cities as a 
result of which the government introduced social cohesion partnerships.  In the 
context of mobility and transience it is important to distinguish between these rather 
more specific uses and the more general issue of the health of the community overall. 
 
The State of the English Cities report viewed social cohesion as a “multi-faceted 
notion covering many different kinds of social phenomena.  The different dimensions 
of cohesion include: 
 
? Material conditions, such as employment, income, health, education 
and housing; 
 
? Social order, safety and freedom from fear, or ‘passive social 
relationships’; 
 
? Positive interactions, exchanges and networks between individuals 
and communities, or ‘active social relationships’ 
 
? The extent of social inclusion, or integration of people into the 
mainstream institutions of civil society; 
 
? Social equality, meaning the level of fairness or disparity of access to 
opportunities or material circumstances (State of the English Cities, 
Volume 1, p109)  
 
More recently, the new Commission on Integration and Cohesion’s terms of reference 
included the need to consider how local areas themselves can play a role in forging 
cohesive and resilient communities, by: 
 
“a) Examining the issues that raise tensions between different groups in different 
areas, and that lead to segregation and conflict; 
b) Suggesting how local community and political leadership can push further 
against perceived barriers to cohesion and integration; 
c) Looking at how local communities themselves can be empowered to tackle 
extremist ideologies; 
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d) Developing approaches that build local areas’ own capacity to prevent 
problems, and ensure they have the structures in place to recover from periods of 
tension” (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2006a). 
This latter view of social cohesion is evidently more concerned with particular aspects 
of migration and political extremism.  The fact that it is rather different from the State 
of the English Cities view is indicative of the ways in which the term can be used by 
people in particular ways.   
 
Whichever definitions or descriptions of social cohesion are used, it is almost certain 
that mobility will inevitably have an impact on it.  Large numbers of people moving 
in and out of an area will potentially impact upon most aspects of both of the 
definitions outlined above.  
 
There is a correlation between longevity of residence in an area and the maintenance 
of ‘active social relationships’ in the area, an element of social cohesion (eg. as in the  
State of the English Cities definition).  Length of residence is linked to having more 
friends and relatives in the area, and to the availability of social support (Coulthard, 
2000). There is even evidence that length of residence may have health effect, for 
example on the likelihood of smoking, possibly partly because people with more 
socials support are able to lead healthier lives (Parkes and Kearns, 2004). Length of 
residence has also been linked to the degree of social mixing between owners and 
renters in areas where tenure had been diversified with the specific hope of increasing 
social cohesion across housing tenure and income groups (Atkinson and Kintrea, 
1998). London has already been found to be the ‘least neighbourly’ region in 
England, with people least likely to know and trust their neighbours (Coulthard et al.,  
2002), partly because of high mobility rates. 
 
It is local authorities that carry out and provide many of the statutory duties and 
services such as electoral registration, children’s education, and personal social 
services that condition ‘mainstream institutions’ which all people need to be 
integrated into to support ‘social equality’ which are elements of social cohesion (eg. 
According to the State of the English Cities definition). As we have seen, high or 
increase d population mobility creates extra difficulties and costs for local authorities 
and other service providers in integrating people into these mainstream institutions.  
 
The additional unrecognised costs to public services resulting from high mobility 
could also create challenges for maintaining and building social cohesion. Where 
mobility is higher, people may have fewer friends and relatives in the area, and less 
social support, and are less likely to be involved in local organisations, which could 
all create greater demands on public services to perform these functions instead. In 
some cases, there is a direct, in undesirable, link between migration/mobility and 
political behaviour.  A 2005 study for the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (Rowntree, 
2005, p15) suggested that extremist political parties were exploiting (unfounded) 
allegations about the priority given to new migrants in public service provision.  
 
The Department for Communities and Local Government, in its 2006 study Moving 
on: reconnecting frequent movers, stated that frequent movers can have a number of 
unfortunate impacts on social cohesion: 
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? they create feelings of anxiety and have a destabilising effect on 
long-term residents; 
 
? cause fears that community identity will change; 
 
? give rise to perceptions of ‘special treatment’ for newcomers; 
 
? lead to mixed feelings among communities about special services 
that may be offered. 
 
This official summary of the social cohesion impacts certainly ties in the research 
undertaken in London for this study. The costs for political management of such 
impacts is impossible to measure, but real.   
 
Evidence from interviews and other sources pointed to a number of important issues 
relating mobility and transience to social cohesion issues.  First, a number of 
respondents noted that the increasingly diverse nature of in-migration to their 
boroughs had reduced the concentrations of particular minorities and indeed led to a 
situation where ‘ we are all minorities now’.  In some ways this was seen as easing the 
situation – although there were always likely to be tensions relating to the last 
entrants.  
 
Secondly, the rapid rise in employment related migration was seen as generating 
problems of anti-social behaviour and local neighbourhood management – often 
simply because of the lack of leisure or adequate housing facilities which result in 
workers congregating on the streets. 
 
Much of the research which has been undertaken points to concerns arising from 
competition for housing and the extent to which priority needs take precedence over 
what are seen as local entitlements .  This is particularly the case in the context of 
overcrowding, as in most London boroughs this is increasing rapidly in the social 
sector resulting in long waits for rehousing even where the household is statutorily 
overcrowded.  
 
More general issues were seen as arising from a simple lack of information and 
communication.  In this context the role of the local authority is often seen to be to 
help organise (and indeed fund) local voluntary organisations that have more 
knowledge and expertise on the ground. 
 
It is worth stressing again that many of the perceived problems come more from rapid 
growth in demand than from mobility as such.  Also many boroughs have been used 
to high turnover rates and do not see that as the sore issue – rather that the attributes 
of migrants are changing and it is costly to develop adequately flexible systems to 
respond to their needs. 
 
Finally it should be carefully noted that many respondents saw migrants as improving 
conditions in the area both in terms of education and of employment and local 
spending power.  Migration and mobility are normal processes.  But the rate of 
increase over the last few years has put particular strains on the system which can be 
expected to continue. 
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6. Implications for Resource Allocation 
 
The English system of government, which is highly centralised by the standards of 
most developed countries, requires over 95 per cent of all tax revenues to be paid to 
the Exchequer.  Council tax, the sole revenue determined beyond the centre (by local 
government), raises only five per cent of all government income.  Moreover, because 
local taxation is capped, there is virtually no discretion in determining overall local 
taxation or expenditure levels.  
 
As a consequence of this top-down system of control, local authorities and other 
public bodies receive funding either through distribution formulae or as the result of 
bidding systems.  Because England has a diverse and complex population of 
50million, the success of formulae and other allocation methods is heavily dependent 
upon the quality of data and other information passed from the local level to the 
centre.  A number of funding formulae are in use within England, including separate 
ones for local government, schools, housing, the NHS and learning & skills. 
 
If the allocation formulae effectively reflected the need to spend of particular services 
from place to place, and if the data used within the formulae are up-to-date and 
accurate, the costs of particular spending needs will be quickly registered and funded 
precisely.  In effect, the national formula would react to local expenditure need and 
move resources to meet it in broadly the way an autonomous local government might 
– if it had the freedom to determine its own resources locally.        
 
However, if the formula and/or data are out-of-date or inaccurate, there will be a 
mismatch between the emergence of new spending demands and the capacity to meet 
them.  Unfortunately, there is much evidence that the local government, schools and 
housing funding formulae in use in England are most unlikely to react to changing 
demography rapidly enough to ensure new demands for services are met. 
 
Thus, for example, the Formula Grant which is used to equalise between authorities 
for spending need variations (and separately for differences in the tax base) does not 
directly measure the costs of disproportionate transience or mobility.  There are 
indicators within the formula that use numbers for  “low achieving ethnic groups” and 
“children in black ethnic groups” as proxies for the higher costs deemed to be 
associated with some minority ethnic populations.  There is a judgemental allowance 
for population “sparsity” in rural areas and for “area costs” in higher-cost authorities.  
But there is no explicit factor within the formula grant for mobility or the costs of 
transience or for cost-drivers such as the need for language services or political 
management issues. 
 
Difficulty of measuring transience may itself make including such a measure within 
formulae very difficult. The research that has been undertaken for the current report 
suggests there are significant problems in defining mobility or transience, particularly 
within a city such as London where there have been significant changes in the trend of 
mobility.  There is no systematic evidence about the costs of transience and thus it has 
hitherto been difficult to present methodologically robust arguments that central 
grants should start to reflect such costs. 
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Moreover, changes in recent years to the operation of the Formula Grant system will 
have further limited the possibility that new or evolving expenditure needs could be 
reflected in the distribution of resources.  First, the government has largely frozen the 
formula used.  Second, damping mechanisms (technically known as ‘floors’) have 
been built into grant distribution to limit the scale of changes from year to year. Third, 
schools’ funding has been ring-fenced and is now largely allocated between 
authorities on the basis of a near-flat percentage increase from year to year.  The 
extent of year-to-year differentiation in grant allocation has been significantly reduced 
as compared with the way the system operated in the past.   
 
Perhaps the only hope for authorities with new or emerging spending needs is that the 
government will be prepared to recognise them in judgementally-determined targeted 
grant based on a proxy measure with replicates the characteristics of highly mobile 
areas. It seems less likely than in the past that formula-based grants will be made 
sensitive to emerging needs.      
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7. Conclusions 
 
This study of mobility and transience has attempted to research the experience and 
knowledge of London boroughs so as to broaden the understanding of a complex set 
of issues.  Most people would assume that an increase in population mobility and 
transience would produce costs and social change issues, particularly in the urban 
centres where it has long been recognised that a rapidly-changing population can have 
challenging consequences. 
 
The research shows that London boroughs have faced a significant increase in 
international in-migration, a parallel rise in out-migration to the rest of the United 
Kingdom, and consequent changes in the resident base.  No other part of the country 
faces anything like it in terms of scale and complexity.  There is relatively little 
literature on the subject of mobility and even fewer quantitative studies of the issue.  
For example, a recent study of migration to rural areas (Commission for Rural 
Communities, 2007) made no estimates of the service costs of the changes shown.  
This absence is explained partly by the relative novelty of mass international in-
migration to the UK and partly by the difficulty in finding a precise way of 
researching ‘mobility’ and ‘transience’. 
 
Mobility is not a simple issue.  For a start, not all mobility drives up costs.  Some new 
migrants demand very few services.  Some, by their aspirational behaviour, improve 
the quality of public service outcomes and thus, at the very least reduce cost 
pressures.  Interviewees made clear that some migrants were of this latter kind. 
 
Moreover, mobility and transience issues are often confused with phenomena such as 
migration, ethnicity and asylum seeking.  Any or all of these factors are likely to 
generate costs and/or cohesion consequences for London boroughs.  But they are not, 
of themselves, ‘mobility’ costs.  It may be difficult to separate out some of the public 
service costs of, say, new migrants from mobility as such. 
 
Nevertheless, the research conducted strongly suggests there are costs and social 
cohesion consequences that flow from increased mobility to London.  A more mobile 
population is, in many cases, likely to weaken the conditions that support cohesion. 
DCLG’s own research has accepted this point (DCLG, 2006a). 
 
Some services self-evidently face costs associated with mobility.  Schools that face 
very high turnover of pupils can identify costs (some of which are cited above) that 
result from the regular movement of children in and out of their institutions.  Housing, 
which is a major challenge to London, can identify costs related to homelessness, 
hostels, asylum and rough sleepers.  A tiny proportion of the population, often highly-
mobile, find themselves destitute and thus become entitled to receive limited local 
funds. 
 
London boroughs face mobility costs that, though hard to measure, are real.  The 
rapid change in the capital’s population in recent years means these pressures will 
remain ‘above trend’. Of course, there are a number of other councils in broadly 
similar positions, though some of them, eg Slough, adjoin London.   
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In a country with a highly-centralised public finance system, sensitivity to the needs, 
costs and cohesion questions posed by mobility will inevitably focus back on 
Whitehall.  The relatively inflexible nature of many funding formulae, and the poor 
data upon which many of them are based, means that the government is likely to have 
to look to targeted resource streams to meet the additional needs of authorities with 
high mobility-related costs.  The political risks involved in failing to meet the 
cohesion needs of areas with mobile populations could be significant. 
 
The research base needs to be improved.  The Government itself should undertake 
work to assess the order of magnitude of the costs that come with mobility and 
transience of different kinds.  There would need to be an agreed way of understanding 
and defining these concepts. 
 
None of this would be impossible.  The British Government often says it wishes to 
pursue evidence-based policy.  The measurement of mobility and transience, and the 
costs associated with delivering public services in areas challenged by rapid change, 
would be a good place to undertake research.  London councils would provide a rich 
basis for study. 
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Appendix A:  Selective Literature Survey 
 
 
There are few studies that specifically focus on population mobility of turnover in 
London. In general, academic literature and policy documents focus on the impacts of 
international migration and/or ethnic minority populations on community cohesion. 
When documents investigate population turnover they tend to focus on particular 
groups, whose arrival or mobility creates specific problems for public services 
delivery in the boroughs, such as children, asylum seekers or homeless people.   
 
The documents described below are some that provide information of relevance to the 
current research.  Most of these studies do not provide any quantification of the cost 
of population mobility or hard evidence of the measurable impacts of the disturbance 
caused by impacts on local cohesion. It is not a full survey of every report that has 
ever been undertaken on mobility and transience.  Moreover, some studies will be 
separately discussed in a section on housing and homelessness later in the report.  But 
the documents considered here give a flavour of the kind of research that has been 
undertaken about mobility and transience in Britain. 
 
A.1 Implications of population mobility 
 
URBACT study:  Building Sustainable Urban Communities, GLE, 2005 
 
The URBACT study is the most comprehensive study of transience and population 
mobility achieved.  It was lead by a team from Greater London Enterprise (GLE) in 
partnership with researchers from Berlin, Brussels and the Association of London 
Government. The study was supported by the European Regional Development Fund 
through URBACT. The URBACT Programme is intended to develop exchanges of 
experience between European cities and organisations working within them. 
 
The study “aims to provide an overview of the population mobility trends at the local 
level and provide recommendations to improve local service provision and delivery, 
ensuring a greater responsiveness to changing local needs” (URBACT study, p 4).  
 
The definition of mobility used in the study was as follows: “residential mobility rate 
can be considered as rate of population changing their address during a fixed period of 
time’” (URBACT study, p 7)   This concept nevertheless needed to embrace a number 
of related factors, eg: 
  
- churn which is described as ‘highly localised’ and related to ‘turnover’; 
- migration, relating to ‘moves over a longer distance’; 
- frequent mobility; 
- transience defined as ‘staying or working in a place for a short time 
only’. 
 
The URBACT study took as its starting point the idea that population mobility has 
increased in recent years due to the role of big cities as ‘magnets’ and the 
development of globalisation. The latter has an impact on migration to cities from 
surrounding regions, from other countries and also on internal mobility within a city.  
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The study addressed the difficulty of creating and developing sustainable 
communities. The research project focused specifically on deprived neighbourhoods, 
particularly ‘entry points’ to the cities and what is perceived as mobility leading to 
particular problems, notably international migration and its consequences.  Problems 
faced by disadvantaged groups and linked to high mobility, notably in terms of access 
to public services, was investigated.  The perceived failure of regeneration initiatives 
in a number of such areas is attributed by the URBACT report to population mobility.  
The study also identified ‘non mobility’ as a possible indicator of disadvantage for a 
neighbourhood.  
 
In London, the study focused on specific groups, namely, homeless people, asylum 
seekers, refugees and members of BAME groups.  The project was particularly 
concerned with the higher costs of mobility associated with such groups.  It did not 
consider the positive benefits of population mobility. 
 
Although there were clear differences between the three cities analysed, the 
methodology of the study was similar in London, Berlin and Brussels, and consisted 
three stages: first, analysis of statistical data, second, a survey-based analysis of local 
mobility patterns and factors behind them, and third the output of focus groups with 
key stakeholders. It also sought to identify and describe best practice in dealing with 
the impacts of population mobility.  
 
The research findings underline key difficulties in measuring population mobility. In 
the United Kingdom it was found there was no specific or agreed measurement of 
population mobility in use.  
 
The most frequently used data to track mobility in the UK, as highlighted below, may 
not measure frequent moves: 
 
? the population Census (Office for National Statistics): registers up 
to one move in the year preceding the census; 
? GPs record new registrations with doctors; 
? Housing Needs Survey: examining housing requirements (needs, 
aspirations and demands) in 27 of the London boroughs;  
? Survey of English Housing: quantifies households which have been 
in their current address for less than 12 months; 
? The Labour Force Survey: undertaken each spring quarter includes 
“information on whether respondents have changed their place of 
residence in the past 12 months”; 
? council tax turnover data. 
 
Records of population mobility involving individuals or families who need two or 
more services cannot be easily shared because of the requirements of data protection 
legislation. In the other two countries, a population register is held: registration of 
newcomers to local authority areas is compulsory, but nevertheless imperfect.  
 
The results of the study are afterwards summarised, city-by-city for Berlin, Brussels 
and London. General conclusions can be drawn from the city studies in terms of 
factors affecting mobility and reasons for moving.   The main factors behind mobility 
identified in the study were: disadvantage, homelessness, international displacement 
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(asylum seekers), overcrowding and lone parenthood.  Clearly not all of these issues 
are relevant only to international in-migrants. 
 
In Berlin there is evidence people from ethnic minority backgrounds are more likely 
to move home. The URBACT survey identified the main reasons for moving as 
follows: better access to a range of shops, better accessibility, the proximity of family 
members and/or friends, more convenient access to a religious institution, a better 
socio-cultural and/or housing offer, as well as changes in household composition. A 
mixture of life-stage reasons (change in household composition, friends etc) and area 
characteristics thus appears to be the key driver of mobility. In terms of policy 
recommendations, the Berlin study concluded with a recommendation of a better 
integration of ethnic minorities. In terms of public services, the Berlin study focused 
on schools, the decisions to move being mostly influenced by the quality of 
educational services.  
 
The Brussels study recorded increased mobility and also tended to focus on migration 
patterns more than on mobility as such. The impacts of the procedures of 
naturalisation within Belgium were quantified. Population mobility is identified as a 
factor that ‘destabilises the economy and labour market’: people are seen as moving 
to Brussels to find a job and then out of the city once they have found employment, 
creating problems for tax ‘flight’ as middle class and more affluent people move out 
of Brussels.  The price of housing and a lack of rented affordable housing are also 
recognised as key factors resulting from population mobility. The Brussels study 
focuses on access to social services by disadvantaged groups and actions taken in 
order adapt legislation and procedures to, for example, allow people without an 
address to be recorded by social services providers and to encourage refugees to have 
better access to public services.  
 
In London, attention was drawn to the existence of a core of frequent movers 
(Fordham Research, 2005) and on the positive role of a choice-based system of 
accommodation allocation in preventing turnover (study on Glasgow in Living in and 
leaving poor neighbourhood conditions in England, Kearns A., Parkes A., 2002).   
The URBACT study provides its own literature review about population mobility in 
London.  The findings of the URBACT literature review were then used alongside the 
results of a survey of  London boroughs, including focus groups.  
 
Three types of population residential mobility were identified, on basis of the London 
Analytical Report (ODPM, 2003):  
 
? students living in private rented accommodation, mostly changing 
from year to year; 
 
? transient workforce spending the beginning/height of their career in 
London before moving on; 
 
? asylum seekers in temporary accommodation around London and 
moving through London  (URBACT study, p 38, citing ODPM, 2003) 
 
URBACT recognised that the first two kinds of mobility might be considered as part 
of the “normal” mobility of a city.  The movement of asylum seekers raises concerns 
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about the instability and costs that temporary households can generate for local public 
services (and, indeed, for the life chances of the individuals concerned).  The study 
also considered “micro” and “macro” – personal reasons for movement or 
institutional/economic/social ones.  The report is also clear that not all mobility is 
costly or problematic.   
 
Looking at mobility and vulnerable groups, the URBACT team concluded “the 
experiences of residential mobility and how these link to situations of disadvantage 
cannot be summarised as a simple set of trends and patterns”.  However, the most 
vulnerable among those that move most frequently were seen as being: “homeless 
people, asylum seekers and refugees and people from black and minority ethnic 
origin”.  The report then discussed (URBACT study, pp 45-50) the consequences of 
mobility for these vulnerable groups.  Some of these consequences include barriers to 
access and language problems.  The implication of barriers of this kind is that there is 
pent-up demand from new migrants to London and other cities. 
 
The impact on public services is seen as threefold: mobility impacts on the type of 
services that have to be provided, on the way services are provided, and on the ability 
of public services to meet targets.   Public services on which an impact has been 
identified by boroughs through the URBACT survey and focus groups were the 
following :  
 
? Education 
Pupil turnover has a detrimental impact on a student’s academic 
achievement and cost implications for schools.  Inner London averages 
conceal in-year mobility rates as high as 60 per cent within particular 
schools.  Pupil mobility is worsened by use of temporary accommodation.  
 
? Housing  
Mobility, in some circumstances, places additional pressures on housing 
services and can increase demand for affordable accommodation. Out of 
borough placements were a seriously problematic issue, leading to social 
segregation and higher costs for ‘receiving’ boroughs. 
 
? Housing benefits 
High levels of housing turnover affects the processing of housing benefits 
claims.  
  
? Regeneration and worklessness services 
Some evidence that worklessness service provision may be affected in terms 
of target performance.  The difference between active and inactive mobility 
may have reduced the overall employment rate, despite the success of 
programme delivery. 
 
? People with special needs 
 The problems of finding housing stock for people with learning difficulties 
are compounded by mobility. Such additional need generates the need to 
travel to access services. 
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? Elderly people 
Increased mobility and dispersal of families has reduced the unpaid care 
available for older people. 
 
? Social services 
A wide range of social services are, according to the URBACT study. 
“certainly” affected by population turnover. Mobility of families makes it 
difficult to keep track of children who are at risk of abuse and also of young 
offenders. 
   
? Tracking people 
Increased mobility makes it more likely the vulnerable will ‘fall through the 
net’ of different services.  Some families may move to evade ‘the system’. 
 
? Asylum seekers 
Costs include: the need for translation services, information adapted for 
people from different cultural backgrounds and helping newly-arrived 
people overcome trauma or stress. 
 
? Health services 
People living in poor and/or temporary accommodation are more likely to 
suffer physical and/or mental health problems.  Homeless households tend to 
be high users of accident & emergency services at hospitals. 
 
? Resource allocation 
Mobility affects the accuracy of population figures which are used to 
determine central government grants to local authorities.  There may be a 
disproportionate need for additional spending as a result of new, mobile, 
residents. 
 
? Council tax collection 
High levels of residential turnover can lead to higher collection costs for 
local taxation. 
 
? Environmental services 
Some authorities reported increased difficulties in relation to the provision 
of advice and enforcement in relation to environmental matters, particularly 
at the lower, mobile, end of the private housing market. 
 
? Planning 
Planning policy was deemed to be impacted by mobility.  For example, the 
number of single-person households had not been as large as anticipated, 
while the need for family homes had grown.  Data about changing 
populations are poor.   
 
? ‘Transition services’ 
There is a need for services assisting people as they move from specialist 
support services to mainstream provision as groups such as asylum seekers 
move towards self-reliance. 
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? Community cohesion 
Local people believe that transient residents are less likely to become 
involved in the locality.  Civic engagement may indeed be low among new 
migrants. Some new groups are stigmatised by the media, causing local 
resentment.  A mobile population may rapidly change the needs of an area, 
rendering earlier regeneration less successful than it might otherwise have 
been.  Political management will be needed to handle these and other issues. 
 
Having catalogued the services that are likely to be affected by population mobility, 
the URBACT researchers did not put any costs to them.  In fairness, the project was 
not intended to achieve such an outcome.  The report did conclude “Existing research 
on the impact of population mobility on local authorities and the services they provide 
is still at an infant stage”.  Moreover a “lack of research may be the consequence of 
the difficulty in measuring population mobility”…”Faced with the lack of own 
measurements, boroughs use alternative ways to track mobility such as looking at new 
council tax accounts or GP registers”.  However, even sources such as these are 
unreliable.  Later in the URBACT study, the authors conclude “The direct costs of 
population mobility should be further evaluated and taken into consideration in the 
planning of services”. 
 
URBACT provided a good, generalised, summary of the kinds of mobility-related 
costs that affect London.  But it did not venture into the more complex territory of 
attempting to put numbers to such costs.  Indeed, our literature study – like 
URBACT’s – has not yielded much detailed quantitative information on the subject of 
services apart from some work completed about schools. 
 
Crossing Borders, Audit Commission, 2007  
 
The latest study by the public services  section of the Audit commission examines the 
local challenges arising from the rapid growth of work related  migrants.  It notes that 
at the national scale foreign workers now make up 6% of the workforce as opposed to 
3.5 % only a decade ago.  It also notes that most of these workers are young and bring 
no dependents – and  therefore tend to use local services only where a crisis occurs.  
This is more costly per unit – eg a visit to the Accident and Emergency Department 
rather than the GP – but overall generates well below average costs. 
While recognising both the direct costs incurred and concerns about potential social 
tensions – notably from lack of leisure opportunities and lack of knowledge on the 
part of local inhabitants – the report provides not costing.  What it does do is stress the 
range of local services that need to be involved,  linked to employment, health, 
education, housing, law and order, and local nuisance and community entitlement and 
the challenges facing authorities across the country in recognising and addressing 
these issues. 
 
The Commission also stressed the importance of voluntary and faith organisations in 
supporting migrants and in addressing problems particularly those of social cohesion.  
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A.2 Migration and Sustainable Cities  
 
The State of the English Cities report, ODPM, 2006 
 
The State of English Cities report did not include a specific study of population 
turnover and mobility in London. However, it did include data and information on 
mobility to/from cities and the UK (including London) and provided an overview of 
population change patterns and trends in the past 20 years.  
 
A dynamic view of international migration, described in the report, shows that the 
volume of international migration to Britain has grown considerably in recent years 
and that the pattern and volume of immigration have therefore been radically 
modified since the early 1990s.  A table in Volume 1 of the report contrasted the 
flows of migrants within the UK and from outside the UK to different kinds of areas.  
The results clearly show London’s far greater levels of migration than those 
experienced in other cities or, indeed, less urban areas. 
 
Table 1 Within UK and international components of total net migration, 
2002-03 
 
            Net flows             Rate (% population 2002) 
 
              Within               Intern-                 Total                  Within  Intern-     Total 
      UK              ational      UK     ational 
 
 England    -22542              145668              123126  -0.05 0.29 0.25 
 
 South and east 
 London  -112521  77226  -35295  -1.31 0.90        0.41 
 Large cities   -10543  13605     3062  -0.30 0.38 0.09 
 Small cities     -4642  10760     6118  -0.13 0.31 0.18 
 Large towns    16477    5902    22379   0.35 0.12 0.47 
 Small towns & 
  rural    82378    3825    86203   0.86 0.04 0.90
     
 
 North and west 
 Metropolitans   -28165  23822     -4343  -0.40 0.34 0.06
   
 Large cities     -7452    7064       -388  -0.23 0.22 0.01
  
 Small cities      5749    3977      9726   0.19 0.13 0.33
   
 Large towns    11598    1768    13366   0.38 0.06 0.44 
 Small towns & 
  rural    24579   -2281    22298   0.74 -0.07 0.67
    
 
(Source: State of the English Cities report, Table 3.6, ODPM) 
 
 
The State of the English Cities report included this table because it made a point about 
the components of population change. But it also shows very clearly the different 
level of migration impact in London as compared to all other kinds of area within 
England.  The ‘turnover’ rate implied by migration within the UK (a net outflow) is 
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significantly higher than for any other area.  For example, within-UK migration in 
London was equivalent to 1.31 per cent of the total population, compared with 0.4 per 
cent of the population in the other metropolitan areas – less than a third the level.  
International migration was equivalent to 0.9 per cent of the population in London, 
compared with less than 0.1 per cent in small towns and rural areas throughout 
England.  The ‘churn’ caused by migration will have increased substantially in the 
period up to 2002-03 as migration in and out of London from the rest of the UK and 
to and from the rest of the world has grown.    
 
The main outputs of the State of the English Cities report did not examine the impacts 
of mobility.  The authors of these volumes were not concerned with such issues as 
public service costs. It does, however, consider the evidence on social cohesion, 
concluding:  “There has been improvement in social cohesion in most cities in recent 
years.  This reflects better national performance in spheres such as employment, 
health and education…..However….cities still face challenges of social exclusion and 
inequality…..Cities in the north and west face bigger challenges than those in the 
south and east” (SEC, Volume 1, page 154) 
 
Many other volumes of evidence have been published under the banner of the State of 
the English Cities, including six new detailed research reports at the end of November 
2006.  Towards the end of a detailed examination of social cohesion, the authors 
conclude that “the dynamics of social cohesion are indeed complex and reflect a 
mixture of local and external forces that interact in ways that can be difficult to 
disentangle fully, let alone identify appropriate policy interventions”.  At the very end 
of the study of social cohesion, the researchers state: “More substantial support is 
often required for localities struggling to cope with the special needs of asylum 
seekers, refugees and other new arrivals.  Central government does sometimes not 
appear to respond quickly enough, or to be sufficiently sympathetic to the extra 
demands new residents make of local services, including schools, social care, housing 
and health, especially where English is not the first language and cultural 
backgrounds differ markedly.  Where existing communities are already vulnerable 
and experiencing economic distress, the arrival of new communities can exacerbate 
social tensions and generate simmering discontent” (State of the English Cities  Social 
Cohesion, DCLG, 2006, page 280) 
 
Although the State of the English Cities suite of reports and research did not directly 
address the impact of mobility on public services, they did publish a number of useful 
data and conclusions that add weight to the research base about the scale of mobility 
in London and its likely impacts.  
 
A.3 Schools 
 
Moving Home and Changing School, Widening the analysis of pupil mobility, 
David Ewens, DMAG Briefing 2005/32, November 2005 
 
Statistics of Schools in London: Key Facts 2001-2005, Karen Osborne, DMAG 
Briefing 2005/41, November 2005, ISSN 1479-7879 
 
The DMAG documents – published by the Greater London Authority – provide an in-
depth analysis of the impact on pupils of moving schools and home. The publications 
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are thus focused more on the impact on pupils themselves than on the impact on 
schools and other public institutions. Nevertheless, studies of this kind can provide 
valuable general information about why pupils that move regularly can be more 
challenging and expensive to educate (thus increasing institutional costs) than pupils 
who rarely or never move. The study uses information from the 2002 and 2003 
National Pupil Dataset, the annual pupil census.  
 
The definition of mobility used was thus: “pupil mobility is generally understood as 
the movement of pupils between schools other than at standard times” (URBACT 
study p1). Research conducted in London has focused on children moving schools as 
it appears that “young Londoners are more likely to be involved in moving home than 
in changing schools at non standard times”. Studying the educational impact of 
children moving home is thus likely to produce evidence about the additional costs of 
mobility. 
  
The key findings of the study confirmed that there “seems to be a relationship 
between educational achievements and children either moving home or changing 
schools” .  Of the pupils studied (in the academic year 2002-03), pupils who did not 
change either home or schools were more likely to attain nationally expected levels of 
outcome than pupils whose both home and school changed during the year. However, 
moving home, even without changing school, does by itself have an impact on 
educational attainment. “The association between moving home and lower 
educational attainment may operate independently of the experience of schooling”. 
  
Moreover the study confirmed that most household mobility within London, at least 
for families with children, takes place within borough boundaries or from/to outside 
London. The study also confirmed that even if some moves are aspirational, 
population turnover might in part be driven by social disadvantage. Indeed: “pupils 
who are entitled to school meals are more likely than other pupils to experience either 
or both domestic or school mobility”. In addition, “Pupils for whom English is not the 
first language are more likely to experience either or both domestic or school 
mobility”.  
 
The study argued for more research on pupil mobility and its impacts on educational 
attainment, deprivation and the ways in which the operation of the housing market 
may interact with these issues. 
 
Breaking Point: Examining disruption caused by pupil mobility, Association of 
London Government, 2005 
 
The former ALG (now London Councils) published a study that provided information 
and analysis about the impact of pupil mobility on public services in London.   
 
According to the study, the impact of pupil mobility was twofold. First, mobility 
caused additional administrative costs for registering new children at non-standard 
times and for building links with parents. These administration costs were quantified 
by the study.  In a primary school, enrolment of a new child, plus work with the 
parents and child averaged 14½ additional hours at an estimated cost of £400 each.  
For secondary schools, the same process represents an average of 29 hours of 
additional work and estimated costs of about £800. Moreover the study also reported 
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that pupil mobility also required unquantifiable work involving teachers and others 
such as extra learning and teaching support staff, which has been estimated to fall 
within a range of zero to 62 hours per child.  Maintaining a record of the educational 
progress of a child is likely to prove difficult if the pupil has frequently moved and/or 
comes from abroad. The report also pointed out that co-ordination between services of 
different boroughs, notably where people live and work in different parts of the city, 
was also problematic and generated costs. 
 
Second, mobility created disruption within the class, often as the result of a lack of 
language skills among newcomers or difficulties for disadvantaged children facing the 
National Curriculum. Children who had recently moved, or moved frequently, were 
more likely to truant. “Just under half of parents in the survey [of homeless 
households in temporary accommodation] said that one or more of their children had 
missed school because of their housing circumstances. The average amount of school 
time missed by an individual child was 55 days” (p25). Some of the children who 
changed school were also likely to be pupils who were at risk of exclusion from their 
previous school and may have moved to avoid such a penalty. These young people 
were disproportionately likely to cause disruption in classes.  
 
This twofold impact was found to limit the ability of schools to attain national 
objectives and targets set by central government.  Moreover pupil mobility was 
concentrated in some schools and some parts of the city, which were usually the 
schools which already had the most significant problems and which could not refuse 
to register new children because they had places available.  A school teacher from 
East London, for example, was quoted as saying that “during the course of the year, 
one class admitted 12 new pupils in a class of 30. There was a special needs pupil 
who was placed in that class and within the space of two weeks that class took in six 
new pupils, most of whom had never been to school before” (p20). 
 
By undertaking research about pupil mobility caused by families moving within the 
temporary accommodation sub-sector, the study also shed light on the unique nature 
of mobility linked to this specific group, which is heavily concentrated in particular 
neighbourhoods and boroughs in London.  
 
A.4 Health 
 
Millett C,  Population Mobility: characteristics of people registering with general 
practices, Public Health (2005) 119, pp 632-638 
 
The study examined characteristics of people joining general practitioner lists in six 
London practices. The most striking findings were that nearly 40 per cent of 
participants took longer than six months to re-register with a GP after a change of 
address. About 13 per cent of participants took longer than one year and seven per 
cent took longer than 3 years to register.   
 
These findings suggested that mobility had a significant impact on access to health 
services, and an impact on health service delivery. Moreover the article reported a 
lack of research on the difficulties of ensuring access to health services to “discrete 
mobile groups such as patients experiencing acute mental health episodes, the 
homeless and asylum seekers” (p 637). Moreover “coverage statistics for childhood 
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vaccinations, immunization against influenza and breast/cervical screening are much 
lower in London than in other parts of the country” (p637). 
 
A.5 Housing, Homeless people and asylum seekers 
 
Literature and statistics reviews give us more information on possible costs 
implications for public services when it comes to the transience of specific groups. 
Specifically, many studies have examined the reasons for moving and the sources of  
unwanted mobility  and underlined the costs and implications of homelessness, and of 
the accommodation of asylum seekers.  
 
Rossi (1955) argued that mobility was not pathological but was largely a normal 
process enabling adjustment to household circumstances.  As such it is unlikely to add 
disproportionately to costs of services  Kendig (1984) described the decision making 
process in more detail classifying moves by whether they were made by ‘adjustors’ or 
whether they were forced.  This second type of move is far more likely to involve 
local services and tp impose disproportionate costs.  The most extreme form of forced 
move are those that involve homelessness or rooflessness. 
 
Most studies reveal the poor quality of life for homeless people in temporary 
accommodation and hostels, which on a long term basis, tends to increase the costs to 
society compared to good accommodation conditions. Particularly, bad life conditions 
such as distance from a desired location, affect costs for sectors such as mental and 
physical health, or the ability to maintain employment. Costs of hidden homelessness 
(overcrowding particularly) and their implications for social and health care costs are 
clear but not quantified.  
 
For example the Communities and Local Government report, ‘Places of Change - 
Tackling homelessness through the Hostels Capital Improvement Programme’ quotes:  
“We found that too many people are staying in the hostel system for too long. Poor 
physical conditions and services that don’t motivate people to address their needs can 
reinforce rather than break the cycle of homelessness. Also many more people have 
been leaving hostels for negative reasons – like eviction or abandonment – than for 
positive ones – like finding employment and a settled home”. (p 2) 
 
Do my kids have to live like that forever? The lives of homeless children and 
families in London, John Reacroft, December 2005. 
 
Barnardo’s published, in December 2005, a report that similarly calls attention to the 
poor conditions of life in hostels and temporary accommodation, particularly 
denouncing their consequences for homeless families and children. The document, 
through seven interviews, gives examples of poor conditions such as overcrowding, 
distance from desired neighbourhood and school, lack of privacy and protection for 
women escaping violent partners, or even on the lack of support to homeless people 
that increases the mental and health problems of many homeless people – and 
therefore costs.  
 
The analysis states that the problem is specifically concentrated in London: ‘The 
number of statutorily homeless households in England rose above 100,000 for the first 
time in 2004, compared with 41,000 in 1997.  Unfortunately, this figure is the tip of 
 56
the iceberg. Many families with children who live in unsuitable and insecure 
temporary accommodation are not included in the statistics. The problem is much 
worse in London, with 62% of all statutorily homeless households in England being 
in the capital.’  (p5) 
 
Comune di Roma Ufficio Immigrazione, Greater London Authority and Berlin 
Senate and funded by the European refugee fund, Europe, Land of Asylum,  
 
This comparative report examines three European cities, and gives specific 
information on asylum seekers and their accommodation in London.  It points out the 
problem of hidden homelessness and hidden housing needs.  
 
GLA, Destitution by design, Withdrawal of support from in-country asylum 
applicants: An impact assessment for London, Feb 2004 
 
The GLA report on asylum seekers also draws attention to the connections between 
homelessness and new legal framework and duties for the accommodation of asylum 
seekers  “London has the highest levels of homelessness and concentration of families 
living in bed and breakfast hotels in the country. In 2001/2 over 30,000 households 
were accepted by London boroughs as unintentionally homeless and in priority need – 
around a quarter of all homelessness acceptances in England”. 
 
“In March 2003 there were 58,597 homeless households in temporary accommodation 
including 7,262 households in bed and breakfast hotels. Approximately 61% of all 
households accepted as homeless in London between January and March 2003 were 
of black or minority ethnic origin – a disproportionately high percentage compared 
with London’s total ethnic population of 32%.  There is an additional (but currently 
un-quantified) group of hidden homeless households – those ‘self placed’ in 
temporary accommodation or living as part of someone else’s household and 
requiring their own separate accommodation. ‘The Government’s national target for 
reducing rough sleeping by two thirds by 2002 has been achieved. But in areas of 
central London the number have reduced by only 48% since 1998 when there were an 
estimated 612 people. In June 2002, there remained an estimated 320 people sleeping 
rough in London.” (p48) 
 
The report also relates homelessness and rough sleeping, and underlines the costs of 
letting people sleep rough for significant periods. Shelter, citing S Keyes and M 
Kennedy, Sick to Death of Homelessness (1992)/P Grenier, Still Dying for a Home 
(1996) states: “… one study into the health risks of street homelessness suggests there 
is a ‘three week rule’. This describes the period during which people rapidly adapt to 
homelessness in order to survive, and after which it much more difficult to integrate 
back into mainstream society. This particularly applies to young people, who tend to 
adapt quickly to survive the trauma of homelessness. The ‘three week rule’ suggests 
that after that brief period individuals are deskilled to such an extent that that they 
lose the interpersonal, budgeting and simple life skills to adapt readily to being 
rehoused. … [and therefore] … often require intensive support and resettlement when 
they are finally housed.”(p43) 
 
The report points to the potential impacts of asylum seeking and the way people are 
welcomed and taken care of on community safety and cohesion. Changes in policy 
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towards asylum seekers can have repercussions for community safety in London – 
positive or negative – at three levels which are distinct though interrelated: 
? public attitudes: risks of hostile action against asylum seekers and 
refugees, and risks of stimulating racism more generally; 
? other threats to the safety and security of asylum seekers; 
? risks of criminal behaviour by asylum seekers.’ (p 59) 
 
Other examples like the one of Lambeth explain how rough sleeping endangers the 
individuals themselves as much as social cohesion: “Box 6: Section 55 and 
community tensions – Lambeth, October 2003 Statement by Deputy Borough 
Commander, Lambeth Borough Police, on events following the arrival locally of 
groups of Section 55 asylum seekers. Sleeping on the streets increases the 
vulnerability of the individuals concerned, many of whom speak little or no English. 
There are clear and obvious dangers and I am aware some of the asylum seekers have, 
allegedly, been verbally abused and that stones have, allegedly, been thrown at them 
whilst sleeping. … We treat such allegations with seriousness – we will not tolerate 
any form of hate crime. … The current situation has the potential to seriously damage 
community relations within Lambeth. Some members of the community are spending 
nights with the asylum seekers, to demonstrate their support [for] them, whilst others 
feel antagonistic towards them – divisive issue. Lambeth is a richly diverse Borough 
and I do not want to see the positive relationships, that have been built, damaged as a 
result of this ongoing situation”. (p 60) 
 
How Many, How Much? Single homelessness and the question of numbers and 
cost published by Peter Kenway and Guy Palmer from the Crisis and New Policy 
Institute 
 
This report, published in 2003, gives some quantification of single homelessness for 
society. Costs include, for example, housing expenditure, such as failed tenancy and 
temporary accommodation; support services; health services; police and criminal 
justice in some cases, unemployment and costs of resettlement.  
 
“The cost of an individual’s homelessness can run to many thousands of pounds, 
suggesting that there may be an economic case for spending money to reduce 
homelessness. We would particularly draw attention to the scale and importance of 
recurring, time-related costs, such as the costs of temporary accommodation and the 
economic cost to society as a whole unemployment associated with homelessness”.  
 
An estimate of costs ‘by category of costs associated with single homelessness’ is 
provided (p 22-23):  The analysis first defines the categories of people who can be 
considered as single homeless and provides quantification by categories and a 
regional breakdown for 2003 (p 25).  
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It is interesting to note that the problem is more concentrated in London than in other 
regions.  
 
Categories cited are “rough sleepers, those who have been provided with supported 
housing for whatever reason (hostels, YMCA, shelters), Bed and Breakfast and other 
boarded accommodation, people at imminent risk of eviction, squatters, involuntary 
sharing – concealed households sharing overcrowded accommodation, involuntary 
sharing – concealed household sharing accommodation which is not overcrowded”. 
The counts of homelessness are then based on an extended definition of homelessness 
that includes hidden homelessness.  
 
The study also proposes a breakdown and identification of unit costs linked with 
homelessness. It identifies both hard costs and soft costs. Costs of homelessness are 
various “Not just to local authorities, the health service or the voluntary agencies 
providing help and support but also to both homeless people themselves and to those 
who helped them” (p 36). Nevertheless only the hard costs, “the ones that mean that 
resources are spent or lost, and which have a direct monetary effect”, which “usually 
fall upon institutions in the public private and voluntary sector” have been quantified.  
 
A.6 DfES and GOL London Child Mobility Project Report of Findings, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, May 2006 
 
This commissioned report, focused on London, covered the following topics: 
 
? How child mobility impacts on the Every Child Matters outcomes for 
children 
 
? Types and definitions of child mobility 
 
? Why the challenges are so great in London 
 
? Young people’s experiences of mobility 
 
? Service delivery issues for mobile children including: 
 
o Cross-cutting issues 
o Issues related to particular groups 
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The report cites OFSTED evidence suggesting that where mobility levels exceed 12 
per cent, there is an impact on standards for all pupils.  Pupil mobility rates exceed 14 
per cent (on average) in inner London and can be as high as 90 per cent in some 
schools.  95 per cent of asylum seekers had been refused GP registration in one of the 
boroughs subject to analysis.   
 
The PWC report concluded that many services would be affected by the consequences 
of mobility among the young: 
 
“In London, and the local authorities surrounding London which children and 
young people move between, the challenge to be able to adapt is particularly 
high.  This is because of the disproportionately high numbers of children in 
need and looked after children, and the high level of movement in London, 
within and between Boroughs for schooling and other statutory and non-
statutory services”(p5). 
 
The authors reported that: 
 
“Linked to the lack of a consistent and agreed definition of child mobility is 
the lack of a consistent and pan-London dataset and data analysis covering all 
forms of mobility.  A range of data sources were drawn to our attention 
through our literature review and interviews, particularly in the area of pupil 
mobility but, there were gaps…..” (p5). 
 
Many examples of mobility in London were quoted, particularly from OFSTED, 
ODPM and the NHS.  Examples of co-operation between boroughs, joint 
responsibility were discussed as was the cost and complexity of coping with mobility.  
Importantly (PWC are accountants as well as management consultants. Moreover, this 
report was conducted for central government), the report concluded: 
 
“…funding from central government does not recognise mobility as a factor in 
funding formulae and any weighting is left to  local discretion.  This also has 
an impact on the grants available to organisations focusing on mobility issues 
in the voluntary and community sector” (p8). 
 
A number of ways children and young people are likely to be affected by mobility.  
Some individuals would fall within more than one category.  The key groups and 
services identified were: 
 
? School pupils 
? Asylum seekers and refugees 
? Disabled children 
? Homelessness and frequent moving 
? Child protection 
? Looked after children 
? Families experiencing domestic violence 
? Teenage pregnancy 
? Young offenders 
? Children with mental health needs. 
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Finally, the report made a number of recommendations for central government, ‘pan 
London working’ and ‘local areas’.   A detailed study of patterns of mobility was 
proposed.    
 
A.7 Services and community cohesion  
 
There is an enormous literature on mobility and transience  and its impact on 
individuals and communities and lately particularly on migration and social cohesion. 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government, Moving on: Reconnecting 
Frequent Movers, July 2006.  
 
This document analysed the link between frequent household movement and 
disadvantage. It focused on deprived areas. It aimed to put the issue of frequent 
movement and disadvantage “on the policy map”. 
 
The document states that “On the whole, population mobility is desirable and positive, 
contributing to economic prosperity, regeneration and a flexible labour market”, it 
goes on to focus on a specific group of frequent movers who were usually difficult for 
public services to reach. This type of mobility “can be less positive, damaging life 
chances and causing or compounding social exclusion”. The report was thus more 
about people than about the impact on public services and was to be used to ‘help plan 
and deliver better services for people who are moving’. As such, services are 
“commissioned by local authorities and must be developed within the local context”, 
this report is particularly important for London boroughs.  
 
The report underlined that, within the 27 areas with a very high population turnover, 
the highest rates were to be found in London. Nevertheless, within this turnover, the 
rate of repeat or frequent moves was not known. Within New Deal for Communities  
areas, it appeared that a high proportion of the population was moving frequently, 
particularly people who had applied for refugee status.  
 
The study also gave information about the sensitivities of frequent movers. From a 
New Deal for Communities survey, it was shown that in comparison with non 
movers, frequent movers “feel less like part of the community” (just over 20 per cent 
for frequent movers and slightly above 40 per cent for movers), “feel less like they 
like they are in a place where neighbours look out for each other” (about 45 per cent 
and 65 per cent), “feel less trusting of health services”, “less satisfied with the police” 
and “are more likely to depend on benefits” (about 35 per cent and 20  per cent). 
 
Nevertheless, drawing conclusions from these results must be attempted with care. 
Reactions might be related to high levels of deprivation or personal factors rather than 
resulting from frequent mobility. Moreover, the concept of ‘community’ is unclear 
and can be interpreted differently by different people, from a local neighbourhood to a 
much wider or alternative kind of community.  
 
The DCLG report also made it clear that frequent movements by disadvantaged 
people were not necessarily out of choice, but might be the result of difficulty of 
finding settled accommodation. Many moves were the result of deliberate decisions 
taken by councils as, for example, was the case for victims of domestic violence or 
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gypsies and travellers. Moreover, access to services might be more difficult for 
frequent movers because they did not know about “services that are available or how 
to find them”, “difficulties in accessing a number of services and being unable to link 
them without help”, “finding that there are not enough services in the area” and 
“finding it difficult to trust services because of personal problems or previous 
experiences” The study concluded that education and health were the two services 
where the impacts of mobility were most likely to be felt. The report showed that 
routine, as well as preventive health care visits did not occur. Registrations with GPs 
were low among frequent movers.  
 
The report gave an overview of the type of problems and additional burdens service 
providers might face when they are working in areas of high population turnover. 
Recommendations were made to improve the provision of services to help people to 
find stable accommodation and to give them ongoing support to help manage and 
sustain their tenancies. The report also highlighted a number of possible service 
impacts, without quantifying them.  Such impacts included: (i) problems related to 
“records transfer and continuity of care”, and the inflexibility (and immobility) of 
funding streams that did not easily allow to ‘follow people across boundaries’.  
 
Finally, possible impacts on community cohesion were considered. The study stated 
that mobility can “create feelings of anxiety and have a de-stabilising effect on long 
term residents”, “cause fears that the community identity will change”, “give rise to 
perceptions of ‘special treatment’ for newcomers” and “lead to mixed feeling among 
communities about specialist services that may be offered”.  
 
House of Commons ODPM: Housing, Planning Local Government and the 
Regions Committee, Social Cohesion , Sixth Report session 2003/04 HC45-1 
 
This inquiry was undertaken in the light of riots in Northern cities. While it accepts 
the LGA/Home Office definition it makes it clear  that the most important aspects 
relate to ethnic minority issues and should not be seen mainly as a law and order 
issue. 
 
Many of the issues raised relate to questions about the use of funds and the 
transparent provision of services to all groups.  As such it addresses the other side of 
the cost coin in that competition  for services in short supply can lead to tension and a 
breakdown in social cohesion. Others relate specifically to the problems of increasing 
diversity and lack of knowledge of minority needs and interests. Particular groups,   
such as young people  and vulnerable households are seen as more difficult to 
integrate.  However while these problems are very real they relate far more to 
ethnicity and inmigration than to mobility as such. 
 
Housing is seen as a key element in the social cohesion agenda – both in terms of 
causality because of competition for accommodation which is in short supply 
particularly  in the social sector and shortages of adequate housing and in terms of 
potential ways of increasing social cohesion through the development of mixed 
communities May, 1997, Robinson, 2005; Hudson et al, forthcoming).  What is also 
clear from this literature  is that issues of social cohesion are very strongly linked to 
the availability and therefore the costs of services especially housing services.  In this 
sense it is not mobility or even necessarily diversity that is seen as the cause of the 
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problem – but simply growing demand together with issues of entitlement versus 
need.  
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Appendix B:  Interviewees 
 
The following individuals were interviewed, generally by telephone, but in one case 
by email, as part of this project.  None of the findings or remarks cited in the report 
should be associated with any individual.  But we are very grateful to them all for 
their time and, in a number of cases, for sending us materials. 
 
Barking & Dagenham; Ken Jones 
 
Jim Ripley 
 
    John Tatam 
 
Haringey:   Gerald Almeroth 
 
Hilda Bond 
 
    Cecilia Hitchens 
 
Ambrose Quashie 
 
Hounslow:   Lorelei Watson 
 
Lewisham:   Ronan Smyth 
 
Newham   Mary Bradley 
 
Claudia Shimplin 
 
Michelle vonAhn
 
Gerry Tighe 
 
Redbridge:    Alan Sizer 
 
Westminster:     Nick Bell 
 
Damien Highwood 
 
Daniel McCarthy 
 
Martin Mitchell 
 
    Keith Wilson 
 
National  Housing Federation : Gavin Smart 
 
 
The project has also benefited from discussions held with Rob Whiteman and senior 
colleagues from Barking and Dagenham, but who were not formally interviewed 
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Appendix C:  Semi-structured Interviews, 
Questionnaire 
 
 
We are looking to assess the extend to which Mobility (and indeed transience) adds to 
the costs of providing services and to the impact of mobility on community cohesion.  
 
1. Has the LA commissioned/ carried out any research on the impact of 
population Mobility on the costs of delivery of particular services? If so which 
ones? If so, what were the findings? 
 
2. Do you regard the population of your Borough as particularly mobile? If so, 
what types of mobility are especially important? 
 
3. In your own experience are there higher or lower costs associated with a 
mobile population? 
If so can you give examples? If so have these become greater or lesser in 
recent years?  
 
4. Is it possible to give broad estimates of such costs and the number to which 
they apply? 
 
 
5. Are there any particular groups within the mobile population who cause 
particular costs to the borough? 
If so, which are they? Is anything done to reduce these costs? 
 
6. Are there any good sources of information on this subject, particularly insofar 
they apply to services other than education? 
 
 
7. Do you have any convincing anecdotes that would exemplify the issue? 
 
8. Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
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